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Introduction
Prologue
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) is generally regarded as the cornerstone of the
international nuclear non-proliferation regime.  It was signed
in 1968 and came into force in 1970.  Among other things, it
sets out the international norms and commitments underlying
that regime.  The Treaty contains a balanced series of
undertakings by both nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and
non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).  The NWS agree not to
assist others to acquire nuclear weapons and to engage in
good faith in a negotiated process of nuclear disarmament.
The NNWS commit themselves not to acquire nuclear
weapons, and to accept the implementation of the safeguards
system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
in their territory, in order to provide the assurance that they
are not engaged in nuclear proliferation.  The Treaty also
confirms that all states have the ‘inalienable right’ to use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
One institutional element of the Treaty is a mandate for
a review of its operation five years after its entry into force,
with the option of repeating this after further five-year
periods.  In addition, after 25 years, a conference was to be
held to decide on the duration of the Treaty. Until the end of
the Cold War, around 1991, progress on nuclear disarmament
had fallen short of expectations, yet the number of States
parties to the Treaty had increased.  At the five-yearly Review
Conferences many states expressed dissatisfaction with the
lack of progress. This was the principal reason why only the
Review Conferences of 1975 and 1985 were able to produce
a consensus Final Declaration.  When the NPT Review and
Extension Conference (NPTREC) commenced in 1995, the
five NWS had become parties to the Treaty, and the number
of non-parties was approaching single figures.  At the same
time, the parties had to confront two unresolved issues: i.e.
evidence that at least two states had been engaged in
non-declared nuclear activities, and the emergence of
non-parties to the Treaty with the capability to make nuclear
explosive devices. Although the NPTREC was not able to
reach consensus on a Final Declaration it did agree to give
the NPT an indefinite duration, and in parallel agreed to three
other decision documents, one on Strengthening the Review
Process for the Treaty, one on Principles and Objectives for
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, and a
Resolution on the Middle East.
The effect of these three decisions was to institute a
revised review process, with annual meetings of the
Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for a Review Conference
in the three years preceding it.  In 1997–99 these sessions
were tasked, among other things, with making substantive
recommendations to the 2000 Conference, including creating
a programme of action for disarmament.  They also focused
attention on the alleged nuclear-weapon programme of one
of the non-parties, Israel.  However, no recommendations to
the 2000 Conference emerged from this process and, as a
consequence, there were low expectations that a consensus
Final Declaration or Document would emerge.
It was therefore a great achievement that the 2000 NPT
Review Conference was, nevertheless, able to end with the
adoption by consensus of such a Final Document. This
contained a ‘Plan of Action’ that sought to promote and
enhance the implementation of the Treaty. As a political text,
underwritten by more than a hundred delegations, parts of the
Final Document were inevitably formulated in general and
vague terms, and many of its prescriptions lacked specificity.
Consequently, as written, the ‘Plan of Action’ would be
difficult to implement.
In the period since the Review Conference, the
international political and strategic environment has changed
drastically, as have the assumptions regarding the practical
implementation of various aspects of this ‘Plan of Action’.
For example, the US has refused to ratify the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), has given notice of its decision to
withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, has
stated its intention to retain a large reserve arsenal of
deactivated nuclear warheads, and has expressed its
skepticism towards formal arms control and disarmament
treaties. Furthermore, the Middle East security situation has
deteriorated, and the potential access to nuclear materials and
weapons by non-state actors has become a more salient issue
in international security following the events of 11 September
2001 in the US.
The Study
It was in this evolving context that, in early 2001, the
Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation
(PPNN) embarked on a study to determine what should and
could be done to give the greatest possible practical effect to
the 2000 NPT Final Document. Its aims were to analyse and
clarify the text of the ‘Plan of Action’ contained in the Final
Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference; elucidate
the commitments made by states parties as reflected in that
Document; define the new realities that would govern the
implementation of those commitments and investigate
possible approaches and strategies through which they might
be met; identify the means by which this might be done,
including some of the institutional aspects involved; and
bring the results of this work to the attention of delegations
attending the 2002 session of the PrepCom for the 2005 NPT
Review Conference.
To ensure that the product of this work would reflect the
full geo-political spectrum and be as authoritative as possible,
PPNN created a Working Group of 12 prominent experts in
the field, from a range of states, who brought to its
deliberations their individual insights and direct experience
in the areas under discussion. The Working Group, the names
of whose members are annexed to this Introduction, made
written and oral contributions to discussions on the drafts of
three working papers on what were judged to be the key
elements of the 2000 ‘Plan of Action’, which had been
prepared by PPNN’s staff. While these contributions have
been taken into account in preparing this final version of the
study, not all members necessarily agree with all aspects of
the analysis contained therein. This analysis remains the sole
responsibility of PPNN’s staff.
The study on the key commitments made in the 2000
NPT Final Document that has emerged from this work is
divided into three parts.  Part I covers the areas of Nuclear
Disarmament and the ‘13 Steps’ towards it.  Part II deals with
Nuclear Non-Proliferation, including proliferation to
non-state actors.  Part III is concerned with Universality of
the NPT. In each of these three elements of the study, areas
of potential action have been analysed using a common
framework, based upon five subheadings: negotiating
history; interpretations; levels of fulfilment; political
realities; and recommendations.  For ease of reference, the
commitments in the Final Document have been numbered
consecutively, starting with the ‘13 steps’.
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Negotiating history
Under this heading, an overview is given of the discussions
at the Review Conference of 2000 that produced the key
provisions contained in the Final Document.  In Part I of the
study, the negotiating history is presented for each subsection.
A similar arrangement is used for Part III, while in Part II the
negotiating history is given more generally for each principal
section. To the extent relevant, and where such information
was available, the material presented under this heading
indicates the origins of the proposal under discussion; what
positions were adopted by states involved in the negotiations;
what changes were made in the various texts proposed in
order to reach consensus; and what elements were omitted.
Interpretations
As indicated earlier, in some areas of the Final Document
consensus was reached only by adopting language which
could be interpreted in more than one way.  In respect of such
areas, analyses are offered of possible ambiguities in the
language as adopted, and the various interpretations which
governments are understood, or might be expected, to attach
to the subparagraph in question, are highlighted.
Levels of fulfilment
The subsections bearing this heading offer five benchmarks,
which could be used to measure the levels of fulfilment of
key proposals contained in the 2000 Final Document. They
range from ‘complete fulfilment’ through ‘positive trends’,
‘no movement’, and ‘outright non-fulfilment’, to ‘other
actions’. Recognising that states will have different
approaches to the precepts contained in the Final Document,
these benchmarks have been formulated in a flexible manner
to leave room for a variety of possible forms of ‘fulfilment’.
In Part III, on Universality, the discussion of ‘levels of
fulfilment’ was judged to be inappropriate in the case of
action by states non-parties to the NPT, since those states are
under no formal obligation to act upon proposals made at an
NPT Review Conference.
Political realities
It is one of the principal purposes of the study to determine
how the action elements in the Final Document can be
realised under current political circumstances.  As a result,
the study has, on occasion, reached conclusions that are at
variance with one of those agreed in 2000, especially with
regard to paragraph 15 and the ‘13 steps’. This was
unavoidable given the changes that have taken place over the
last two years.  These conclusions should not be interpreted
as raising doubts, however, about the continued validity and
relevance of the NPT and the regime of which it is the
cornerstone. Over the years the Treaty regime has been shown
to have a degree of flexibility which enables it to cope with
drastic changes in the conditions under which it operates, as
seen between 1988 and 1995. As a consequence, the
recommendations made in the study have been formulated
with an eye both to the current political realities and the
absolute necessity of sustaining the NPT.
Recommendations
The drafters of this study have sought to make a wide range
of practical suggestions for actions that might promote or
facilitate implementation of the commitments called for in the
Final Document. Where appropriate, this includes
recommendations for the implementation of the ‘Other
actions’ discussed in the section under ‘Levels of fulfilment.’
 The recommendations have been formulated in a way that
should provide flexibility in the way they are implemented.
Epilogue
In producing this action-oriented Final Document, an NPT
Review Conference has once again shown itself to be a unique
forum for the discussion of issues of global importance.
Nevertheless, the drafters of the study feel obliged to draw
attention to the fact that the Review Conference has not been
able to deal satisfactory or effectively with two areas of major
concern. The first is the issue of universality and the position
of the three nuclear-capable hold-out states vis-à-vis the NPT.
The second is the question of how to address effectively
allegations of non-compliance with the Treaty and the regime
in general, and the inability of the international community
to deal with this problem.  The Treaty and its regime have
been faced with similar inherently intractable problems
before, and this will no doubt continue to be the case. One
current example of the latter type of problem is the refusal of
Iraq to submit to the regime and thereby enable the
international community to determine whether, and to what
extent, it is complying with the relevant legal and political
instruments. But the existence of such problems does not
result from a flaw in the Treaty itself: it arises from the
inability of the international community to find a solution that
will satisfy all and the unwillingness of some states to abide
by their existing commitments.
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Part I: Nuclear Disarmament and the ‘13 Steps’
This part of the study seeks to achieve two goals. First, to
provide a comprehensive analysis of the origins and
meanings of the so-called ‘13 steps’ that became paragraph
15 of the part of the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review
Conference that dealt with Article VI and related issues.
Secondly, to highlight the problems associated with the
implementation of these steps, and to make recommendations
for future action based on this analysis.
Frequent reference is made in this part of the study to the
9 May and 15 May texts.  The 9 May text (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.1/SB.1/CRP.7) was a chairman’s working paper that
brought together for the first time the range of issues being
addressed as part of the ‘forward look’ at disarmament
activities. The 15 May text (NPT/CONF.2000/CRP.2) was an
amended version of this working paper, which included all
the changes that had been negotiated in the intervening six
days both in direct but informal negotiations outside the
conference between the New Agenda Coalition (NAC)1 and
the NWS, and later in more formal ones within it.
The ‘13 Steps’
The ‘13 steps,’ which are listed below, were prefaced by the
following text: ‘The Conference agrees on the following
practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to
implement article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995
Decision on ‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.’
1.  The CTBT
‘The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in
accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve early entry into force of the CTBT.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 1]
Negotiating history
This text originated in a NATO-52 proposal (NPT/
CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7). During discussions on 10 May,
Italy proposed to insert the words ‘not later than 2005’ into
the paragraph, but this was rejected. ‘And in accordance with
constitutional processes’ was added in the draft of 15 May by
the US, while ‘without delay and without conditions’ was
aimed inter alia at India and Pakistan.
Interpretations
While constitutional processes may differ from state to state,
there is little ambiguity attached to this statement. It calls for
urgent ratification of the CTBT by all states, without
conditions of any kind. The reason why a number of states
sought the inclusion of the phrase ‘without conditions’ was
that, in certain cases, conditions attached to ratification may
be inconsistent with the objectives of the Treaty.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – ratification of the CTBT, without
conditions, by all 44 states needed for entry into force of
the Treaty.
• Positive steps — signature of the CTBT and/or the start of
ratification procedures by those states among the 44 that
have yet to do so.
• No movement – the absence of positive statements
indicating the intention to take the steps mentioned above.
Statements that no final decision on the matter has been
taken.
• Outright non-fulfilment – a statement of intention to
withdraw from the Treaty, or not to ratify it.
• Other actions – moves to complete the International Moni-
toring System (IMS) and other elements of the CTBT veri-
fication system. Continuation of the testing moratorium.
Political realities
Among the NWS, France, Russia, and the UK have signed
and ratified the CTBT without conditions.  China has
submitted the Treaty for ratification to the Peoples’ Congress.
The US is the only country to have brought the ratification of
the CTBT to a vote in its legislature and where its ratification
has been refused.
The preparatory work for the CTBT Organization
(CTBTO) has been under political and financial pressure. The
US administration has made it clear on a number of occasions
that it does not intend to ratify the CTBT and has doubts about
the value of the Treaty. It has adjusted its financial
contribution to the budget of the CTBTO to enable it to
continue to fund the work of the IMS and the International
Data Centre (IDC), but not that of developing its on-site
inspection capabilities.
Three of the states needed for entry into force have yet
to sign the Treaty. One, an NPT party, is the DPRK. The other
two, India and Pakistan, are non-parties to the Treaty.
Recommendations
• The IMS and the IDC should be completed.
• Those non-signatories and non-parties to the CTBT which
are in a position to carry out nuclear explosive tests should
be encouraged to maintain testing moratoria.
• The international community should continue promoting
the ratification and entry into force of the CTBT. Such
efforts could include putting pressure first on states that
hold out the likelihood that they might eventually join the
Treaty, and later concentrating on states that have
indicated no willingness to do so.
• Pressure should be kept up on the US to ratify the Treaty,
or at least not to slide backwards.
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2.  A Moratorium
‘A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of
that Treaty.’  [Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 2]
Negotiating history
This text originated from similar formulations in working
papers submitted by Canada (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/
WP.4), Japan, and Australia (NPT/CONF.2000MC.I/SB.1/
WP.1).
Interpretations
This was a relatively uncontroversial commitment, gaining
wide political consensus. It calls for a moratorium on the
nuclear testing activities that are banned by the CTBT.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all states in a position to carry out
nuclear explosive tests abide by the moratorium, pending
entry into force of the CTBT.
• Positive steps – states publicly declare their intention to
adhere to the moratorium for the time being.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states resume nuclear-weapons-
test explosions.
• Other actions – test sites are dismantled.
Political realities
A testing moratorium is in place. However, as part of its
Nuclear Posture Review, the US is reviewing the steps that
would be necessary to reduce the lead-time for the resumption
of nuclear testing.
Recommendations
• The testing moratorium should continue, pending entry
into force of the CTBT.
• All states in a position to carry out nuclear explosive tests
should publicly confirm their intention to refrain from
doing so.
3.  Fissile Material
‘The necessity of negotiations in the CD on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and
effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate
contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation
objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the
immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 3]
Negotiating history
This text originated in a NAC proposal (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.I/WP.3) and the NWS joint statement. During
discussions over the 9 May draft document, a number of
delegations wanted to start this paragraph with the
‘immediate commencement’ rather than ‘the necessity’. The
NAC proposal included a call for a moratorium on fissile
material production for nuclear weapon purposes. The
compromise that was eventually agreed linked the
commencement of negotiations on a ‘fissile material cut-off
treaty’ (FMCT) to agreement on a balanced programme of
work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
In the draft document of 15 May, the phrase ‘with a view
to their conclusion by 2005,’ (which originated in a working
paper submitted by Japan and Australia
[NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.1/WP.1]) became ‘with a view
to their conclusion within five years,’ and was moved to the
end of the paragraph, in substitution of the phrase ‘and early
conclusion.’
Interpretations
This provision calls for the ‘commencement of negotiations
of such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five
years.’ This weakened the original time commitment
considerably, changing it from a clear deadline of 2005, to a
much more flexible deadline, calling for negotiations on an
FMCT to be completed five years after their commencement,
whenever that may be.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – states commence negotiations
towards an FMCT in the CD.
• Positive steps – states take steps to facilitate the
commencement of negotiations toward an FMCT in the
CD, for example, by agreeing on a programme of work.
• No movement – the deadlock continues. Absence of a
pertinent decision in the CD.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states make no effort to begin
negotiating a treaty, state their intention not to engage in
negotiations, or obstruct them. Fissile material production
for military purposes is resumed, or continued.
• Other actions – states explore alternative options for
negotiating an FMCT. Production moratoria by India,
Israel and Pakistan.
Political realities
The Final Document backtracks from the 1995 Principles and
Objectives on this issue. The Principles and Objectives did
not link the start of negotiations to any other activity. This
text implicitly accepts that they are linked to other issues,
such as outer space, through the emphasis on agreeing on a
programme of work in the CD. This raises questions over
what should be done when backtracking happens between
one Review Conference and the next (i.e. a lesser undertaking
is adopted in a Final Document than was accepted previously)
and how to rebuild momentum when this occurs.
Prospects for positive steps towards an FMCT are not
good. At its 2000 and 2001 sessions, the CD was unable to
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agree on a programme of work. The result has been a
stalemate, partly due to the linkages that persist between the
FMCT, nuclear disarmament, and the outer space issue, and
partly due to the refusal of India, Israel, and Pakistan to accept
production moratoria. In addition, US plans to deploy a
nation-wide missile defence system may reduce chances of
progress. China has already indicted that it is moved to attach
ever more importance to discussions on the issue of
demilitarisation of outer space, while the US is less likely than
ever before to agree to hold such discussions.
Recommendations
• The NWS should maintain fissile material production
moratoria and consider establishing a voluntary
transparency and accountability regime.
• There should be technical and scientific seminars on the
margins of the CD to discuss scope, definitions,
transparency, accountability, and verification of an FMCT.
• Efforts should continue in the CD to break the deadlock
over the establishment of an ad hoc committee on an
FMCT with a negotiating mandate.
• A group of experts should be established to examine
possible verification measures in the context of an FMCT.
4.  Nuclear Disarmament & the CD
‘The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a
mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a
programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 4]
Negotiating history
This text originated in a NAC proposal (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.I/WP.3). In the draft of 15 May, the phrase ‘The
immediate establishment’ was replaced with ‘The necessity
of establishing.’  The second sentence, on the CD’s
programme of work, was added later.
Interpretations
This is formulated so as to take account of the lack of
agreement on negotiating multilaterally in the CD on nuclear
disarmament while yet sustaining consensus and covering a
wide range of possibilities for action. While nothing is
excluded, it is left to the CD to negotiate a mandate for such
a body. Although this is the first time the NWS have agreed
to an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament, the
reference to a ‘programme of work’ is seen by many as
holding movement in this area hostage to agreement at the
CD on other proposed subsidiary bodies.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – a subsidiary body is established in
the CD to deal with nuclear disarmament.
• Positive steps – key states make statements in favour of
establishing such a body and commencing steps towards
this end.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states oppose/obstruct the
establishment of a body to deal with nuclear disarmament
in the CD.
• Other actions – an ad hoc body is established outside the
CD to deal with nuclear disarmament, and reports to the
CD on its findings.
Political realities
The CD has yet to agree on its work programme and, without
this, there can be no progress in establishing a body at the CD
to deal with nuclear disarmament.
The NWS are opposed to the establishment of an ad hoc
committee on nuclear disarmament with a mandate that calls
for that body to negotiate on matters deemed to require
bilateral negotiations. The US has been opposed to such
negotiations since discussions started in 1997. China is
wedded to the linkage between negotiations over FMCT,
Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) and the
ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament. Russia is strongly
opposed to a time-bound framework on nuclear disarmament.
Recommendations
• The parties should be prepared to agree to the
establishment of a subsidiary body, with or without
explicit reference to negotiations. This would formalise
substantive exchanges and dialogue between nuclear and
non-nuclear-weapon states.
• Beyond this, and more generally, the following steps
would be appropriate:
— a discussion by an ad hoc group of steps towards
systematic and progressive elimination of nuclear
weapons;
— dialogue between the NWS and the NNWS towards the
implementation of this commitment;
— technical and political seminars in the margins of the
CD to address issues of scope, definitions, verification
and negotiating approaches pending agreement on a
programme of work; and
— the development of ad hoc exchanges between the
NWS and the NNWS as a means, inter alia, to establish
a precedent that the latter have a legitimate interest and
right to question the former on nuclear disarmament
matters.
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5.  Irreversibility
‘The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and
reduction measures.’ [Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 5]
Negotiating history
This was originally an EU proposal, taken from its common
position (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.5). During negotia-
tions over the 9 May draft document, Australia, France,
Germany, Japan, the UK and the US wanted to use ‘guide’ as
the pertinent verb, while several non-aligned states preferred
to retain the existing verb ‘to apply,’ being the stronger term.
In the draft of 15 May, the wording of this paragraph was
changed from ‘being applied to all nuclear disarmament and
nuclear arms control measures’ to the present formulation.
Interpretations
This is an unambiguous commitment to a general principle.
Its degree of fulfilment depends on the specific measure with
which it is connected. It creates a political commitment that
nuclear disarmament and related measures, once made, must
not be reversed unless they are replaced by measures that are
at least equivalent, or that go even further. The problem,
however, lies in how to interpret it when applied to specific
disarmament actions.
In practice, irreversibility is best achieved by disarma-
ment steps that are difficult and costly to reverse. The closure
and dismantling of plutonium (Pu) production reactors or of
a test site or the destruction of missiles and silos are examples.
Also, legally binding commitments are politically more
costly to reverse than those which lack a legal basis. The
principle applies to unilateral, bilateral and multilateral
disarmament measures, whether negotiated or not.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – states take further disarmament
steps that are difficult and costly to reverse, such as the
closure and dismantling of Pu production reactors or of test
sites, or the destruction of missiles and silos.
• Positive trends – states reaffirm that existing nuclear
disarmament steps are irreversible.
• No movement – states do not indicate whether or not they
consider existing and future nuclear disarmament steps to
be irreversible.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states reverse existing disarma-
ment measures. States adopt unilateral disarmament
actions, which do not include provisions intended to make
them more difficult to reverse.
• Other actions – states engage in further research (technical
studies) on how to make disarmament steps more difficult
and costly to reverse.
Political realities
Under the Bush Administration, there is some question as to
whether the US may regard all agreements and treaties in the
area of arms control and disarmament as open to change, and
even replacement, if circumstances dictate. If this policy was
to be adopted, it could undermine the mutual reassurance and
predictability that other states consider such treaties to
provide.
Recommendations
• States should continue to stress the overall benefits of
irreversibility – in the form of agreements and their
implementation – as part of the arms control process.
• Discussions should be encouraged between NWS and
NNWS on the implementation of irreversible disarmament
steps, in the NPT context and in any CD ad hoc group.
• There should be further research into the relationship
between irreversibility, transparency and verification,
including an assessment of the different actions that would
be technically difficult or costly to reverse.
6.  An Unequivocal Undertaking
‘An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 6]
Negotiating history
This originated from a NAC proposal (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.I/WP.3), which called upon ‘the five nuclear weapon
States to make an unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the
total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and, in the course
of the forthcoming Review period 2000–05, to engage in an
accelerated process of negotiations and to take steps leading
to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are
committed under Article VI’.  The call for an accelerated
process of negotiations was dropped in the course of the
negotiations, as some of the NWS argued that measures
recently taken did not require an accelerated process on their
part for the period 2000–05. In addition, in the prevailing state
of bilateral relations, Russia and the US were unwilling to
commit themselves to an accelerated process.
Interpretations
This reference to an ‘unequivocal undertaking’ represents the
strongest reaffirmation so far of the commitment to the global
elimination of nuclear weapons. This gives diplomatic weight
to the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory
opinion, which interpreted Article VI in the light of other
legal obligations, de-linking nuclear disarmament from
general and complete disarmament and making explicit that
the Article VI obligation on negotiations in good faith implies
bringing negotiations to a conclusion.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – engagement of the NWS in a
process towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,
complemented by unilateral disarmament measures.
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• Positive steps – reaffirmation of steps to proceed with the
actions outlined above.
• No movement – failure of the NWS to engage in
disarmament measures.
• Outright non-fulfilment – any actions that intentionally
obstruct disarmament negotiations or undermine existing
arms control and disarmament treaties. Steps that increase
the numbers, operational status or overall role of nuclear
weapons, both strategic and non-strategic.
• Other actions – discussion of Malaysia’s proposal in 2000
to consider the elements required for a nuclear weapon
convention.
Political realities
Following the Conference, officials in some NWS were quick
to deny that the Final Document’s reference to ‘unequivocal
commitment’ represented a significant shift in their
approaches to global nuclear disarmament. Their message
appeared to be that, although a ‘principle’ had been agreed,
the lack of a timetable meant that this commitment was
unlikely to be translated into concrete measures for the
foreseeable future. Moreover, holding the NWS to their
commitment to the principle of the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals may be a challenge in itself, given the
international political tensions between China, Russia and the
US over missile defences and the weaponisation of space.
Recommendation
• In order to have productive discussions on ways to give
effect to this commitment, debate about the exact meaning
of ‘unequivocal undertaking’ should be avoided.
7.  START & the ABM Treaty
‘The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as
possible while preserving and strengthening the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems as
a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in
accordance with its provisions.’ [Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 7]
Negotiating history
Taken from the NWS statement, this derives from the 1999
Cologne Summit Communiqué issued by Russia and the US,
which was restated at the Review Conference. The paragraph
remained unchanged during the discussions over the 9 May
and 15 May drafts. As such, for the purposes of the
Conference, the ABM issue was removed as a debating point,
although it remained in the background in the discussions
over other proposals.
Interpretations
The reference to ‘preserving and strengthening’ the ABM
Treaty as ‘a cornerstone of strategic stability’ is not consistent
with abrogation of that Treaty.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – entry into force of START II and
conclusion of START III whilst preserving and
strengthening the ABM Treaty.
• Positive steps – any actions that promote entry into force
of START II and the conclusion of START III in the
context of preserving the ABM Treaty.
• No movement – no attempt to ensure entry into force of
START II or negotiations on START III.
• Outright non-fulfilment – actions that obstruct entry into
force of START II and prevent negotiations on START III,
or that undermine the ABM Treaty (particularly unilateral
withdrawal/abrogation), and are not compensated for by
positive developments.
• Other actions – agreement on a new strategic framework
between the US and Russia, which would include
irreversible and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons.
This could act as a counter balance to the negative actions
listed under outright non-fulfilment.
Political realities
On 13 December 2001, the US announced its intention to
unilaterally withdraw from the ABM Treaty, thereby
rendering the Treaty, and this element of the ‘13 steps’,
defunct. Before the announcement was made, Bush also made
clear on a number of occasions that he was not interested in
pursuing the START process any further, and that he
preferred to pursue unilateral parallel reductions of strategic
forces without any formal treaty.
These announcements raised fears of a serious
breakdown in US-Russian relations, and a possible reverse in
the bilateral nuclear reductions process. However, the
Russian response to the US withdrawal has so far been milder
than expected, especially when compared to Moscow’s
statements on this issue throughout 2000 and most of 2001.
Following US withdrawal, Putin described the US decision
as ‘a mistake,’ and called for the early development of a new
framework for a strategic relationship between the two
countries.
The question now is what form this framework might
take. The two leaders have discussed reductions in strategic
nuclear forces that go beyond START I levels, but nothing
has been confirmed and, significantly, they appear to disagree
over the question of whether warheads should be removed
from launchers, kept in reserve, or destroyed. Questions also
remain over how parallel unilateral cuts would be verified,
and whether they would be the subject of a written agreement.
(See also ‘Political realities’ of 9a, below).
Recommendations
• Russia and the US should pursue efforts to conclude a new,
verifiable treaty covering nuclear reductions, and to reach
a compromise over the ABM issue.
• Radical reductions in the nuclear arsenals of Russia and
the US should be a central part of any new strategic
framework.
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8.  The Trilateral Initiative
‘The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the
Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 8]
Negotiating history
The Trilateral Initiative was launched to address a desire to
apply verification measures to fissile material that is surplus
to military requirements without revealing sensitive nuclear-
weapon information. The original proposal referred to all the
NWS, but this was amended at UK and French insistence
because, in their case, such material is subject to Euratom
safeguards. South Africa wished to add a reference to irrever-
sibility to the amended paragraph, but this was rejected.
Interpretations
The language of this proposal is unlikely to be open to
different interpretations. It refers to the verification regime
being created by the IAEA, Russia and the US, under the joint
initiative they launched in 1996. The intention is to verify the
storage and disposition of excess plutonium (Pu) and highly
enriched uranium (HEU) from nuclear weapons in Russia and
the US, some of which may be in forms that contain nuclear
weapon design information, without risk that this should get
into the wrong hands. This would create the first IAEA
verification (as distinct from traditional safeguards) regime
designed for disarmament purposes. The initiative is intended
to promote international confidence that fissile material made
subject to IAEA verification by either of the two states will
remain irreversibly removed from their nuclear weapons
programmes. It is also hoped that the regime will eventually
establish a precedent for verifying excess material stocks in
all states possessing nuclear weapons.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – Russia and the US complete and
implement the Trilateral Initiative.
• Positive steps – Russia and the US continue their efforts to
ensure the early conclusion and implementation of the
initiative.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – any actions intended to prevent
completion and implementation.
• Other actions – bilateral arrangements with the IAEA by
Russia and the US for verification of excess Pu and HEU,
including the development of verification technology
involving the IAEA.
Political realities
There may be problems ahead that could undermine the
implementation of the initiative. First, Washington is
unwilling to fund the exercise. Second, Russia and the US
disagree on the scope of the verification measures, and the
nature and the quantities of the material subject to
verification.
Recommendations
• Russia and the US should move rapidly to complete and
implement the Trilateral Initiative through an agreement,
or agreements, with the IAEA.
• Pending conclusion of the agreement, both countries
should continue to remove excess Pu from their dedicated
military stockpiles.
9.  International Stability and Undiminished Security
‘Steps by all the nuclear weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international
stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, ‘chapeau’ to sub-paragraph 9]
Negotiating history
In the initial negotiations on the six undertakings eventually
brought together under paragraph 9, Russia sought to have
each of them prefaced by a reference to the maintenance and
upholding of ‘strategic stability.’ Those negotiating the text
settled upon the universally accepted term ‘international
stability’ found in the Final Declaration of of the First UN
Special Session on Disarmament. This was coupled with
another traditional formulation, ‘the principle of
undiminished security for all.’ The final organisation of the
six elements in a single paragraph under a heading, proposed
by the UK, was chosen over the repetitive rehearsal of the
same principle in six different paragraphs.
The call in this heading to ‘all the nuclear weapon states’
originated in a NAC document (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/
WP.3) which divided the programme of nuclear disarmament
into three complementary elements, to be pursued in parallel
by the NWS and the NNWS, separately and together.  This
programme included:
• action at the bilateral level between Russia and the US;
• action by all the NWS acting unilaterally or collectively;
and
• action at the multilateral level.
The intention was to provide for action by all the NWS and
in so doing to highlight the undertakings of the lesser ones in
the nuclear disarmament process.
Interpretations
The language is a ‘chapeau’, or ‘heading’, for the specific
steps that follow. The NAC proposals covered by this heading
were acceptable to the NWS as it gave them the flexibility to
take account of their national security concerns (i.e. their own
interpretation of the principles of international stability and
undiminished security) in implementing these disarmament
measures. These concerns included the abrogation of the
ABM Treaty.
The language talks about steps by ‘all the nuclear weapon
States’.  Rather than implying a collective effort on their part
in each of the steps that are listed, it seems likely that this was
inserted to highlight the existence of an obligation on the part
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of China, France and the UK to engage in some or all of these
steps as the disarmament process proceeds.  It also highlights
the importance of all the NWS ensuring that their actions do
not generate insecurity in other countries.
Levels of fulfilment
Levels of fulfilment are only relevant to the specific steps that
follow this heading.
Political realities
This heading provided the framework for reaching a
consensus on the need to implement six important steps
(listed below) towards nuclear disarmament. Its language
reflects the reality that the security concerns of the NWS will
need to be met if the process of nuclear disarmament is to
proceed. In this context, it is understood that, for Russia, the
phrase ‘undiminished security’ served as a warning against
the possibility of a US unilateral deployment of national
missile defences.
Recommendations
• There should be active engagement, especially among the
NWS, to generate an international situation conducive to
the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures.
• Debate should be encouraged within and among govern-
ments, the UN, NGOs and think tanks on the concepts of
‘international/strategic stability’ and ‘undiminished
security’.  Discussion is needed on how these concepts
should be defined in the context of the development of
missile defences, missile proliferation, and the weaponisa-
tion of space.  In addition, new thinking is required about
the role of nuclear weapons and concepts of deterrence; the
proliferation of nuclear weapons; and the future of arms
control and disarmament agreements and regimes.
9a.  Unilateral Reductions
‘— Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 9, first item]
Negotiating history
This wording originated from a US proposal, and remained
untouched in the 9 and 15 May drafts, although in the latter
it was conditioned by the language of the heading.
Interpretations
It should be noted that although this was intended to be an
unambiguous statement applying to all five NWS, it is
qualified to some extent by the heading (see discussion under
9 above). Also, it calls on the NWS to make ‘further efforts’
at unilateral reductions, rather that calling directly for such
reductions. There are several practical questions surrounding
the phrase ‘to reduce their nuclear arsenals’. The reference to
nuclear arsenals appears to relate to nuclear warheads, rather
than delivery systems, while a reduction appears to go beyond
removing warheads from deployment.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – further unilateral cuts in strategic
and/or tactical arsenals by all NWS.
• Positive steps – unilateral cuts in nuclear arsenals by some
NWS; announcement of the intention to undertake
unilateral cuts by some NWS.
• No movement – no further unilateral cuts in nuclear
arsenals.
• Outright non-fulfilment - increases in numbers of nuclear
weapons. Modernisation of nuclear weapons.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
France and the UK believe that for now they have gone far
enough with their unilateral cuts. China remains opposed to
unilateral measures and shows no signs in changing its
position.  Russia and the US made significant reductions in
their nuclear arsenals on a unilateral basis in the early 1990s,
and have also made reductions in advance of their START
Treaty commitments. However, although President Bush
stated at the Crawford Summit that the US was contemplating
reducing its deployed strategic nuclear arsenal to between
1700 and 2300 warheads, the Nuclear Posture Review has
indicated that existing nuclear weapons systems will be
retained in a de-activated or de-alerted mode, rather than be
destroyed. Russia does not regard these ‘hedge’ forces as
contributing to a ‘reduction in nuclear arsenals.’
Recommendations
• There should be further reductions in nuclear arsenals and
in military stocks of fissile material.
• To build confidence and reassurance, unilateral reductions
could be accompanied by qualitative and quantitative
information on the nature and size of the cuts, and by
voluntary transparency measures offering the possibility
of later international inspection. Such reductions could
also take place within the implementation framework
provided by pre-existing treaties, and could be open to later
legal codification.
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9b.  Transparency
‘— Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the (sic) nuclear weapon capabilities
and the implementation [by the nuclear-weapon States] of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a
voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 9, second item]
Negotiating history
This was derived from an EU proposal (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.I/SB.I/WP.2).  Its initial language did not include refer-
ence to agreements or voluntary measures, and focused solely
on transparency of nuclear arsenals and fissile materials.
During negotiations over the 9 May draft, it became clear
that there existed widely different perspectives on trans-
parency among the States parties. China, for example,
preferred a less specific interpretation, not including numbers
of warheads. The NAC wanted transparency to apply to
nuclear arsenals and materials. The NATO-5 wanted
materials left out, but favoured transparency over numbers of
weapons. France was in favour of opening facilities to
inspection and the transparent implementation of agreements,
but wanted to stop short of providing details of numbers of
weapons. As a consequence, China asked to have this
paragraph deleted but later withdrew its objection. Russia
wanted to characterise transparency as a voluntary
confidence building measure, and did so by using language
in the EU common position on ‘transparency as a voluntary
measure’. As a consequence, in the 15 May draft, the phrase:
‘[States] with regard to their nuclear arsenals and fissile
material inventories as a confidence building measure
supporting [progress]’ was changed to the current
formulation. Although China accepted this formulation, its
representative argued in his statement after the Final Docu-
ment had been adopted that ‘transparency and
confidence-building measures’ would not be feasible without
unconditional no-first-use and negative security assurance
agreements, and the termination of nuclear-sharing alliances.
Interpretations
In the interest of consensus, the language on transparency
adopted by the Conference was kept non-specific, allowing
for a broad interpretation that would not threaten the national
security interests of the NWS. The result was that states
emerged with different perspectives of what had been agreed.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – increased transparency by all the
NWS over nuclear weapon holdings and activities.
• Positive steps – continuation of existing transparency
measures (as these would increase information on relevant
matters).
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – the cessation of existing
transparency measures.
• Other actions – transparency only in the context of the
implementation of agreements.
Political realities
Although some NWS are concerned about the impact of
greater transparency upon their national security, there has
been a steady rise in support for such measures within the
international community, including among some NATO
member states.  The wording of this paragraph represents an
attempt to balance the two considerations.
At the same time, September 11 has introduced a new
factor into this equation, namely the need to safeguard
information that could be of value to terrorists. START I, for
example, contained very precise information on the locations
of specific facilities. A further new factor is that any attempt
to reach an accommodation over missile defences between
the US and other NWS will necessitate increased
transparency over the capabilities of both offensive and
defensive systems, especially if some type of offence/defence
trade-off is to be attempted.
In practice, China, France and the UK, the NWS with
relatively small nuclear arsenals, relied heavily in their past
national security policies upon secrecy about the size and
capabilities of those arsenals. Transparency may have greater
security consequences for these states than for Russia and the
US.
In 1995, the NWS began providing varying levels of data
regarding their national implementation of Article VI to the
review process of the NPT. This reporting has not been
standardised, may be incomplete, and is not subject to
verification, but it does signal a positive development towards
greater transparency (see also 12, below).
Given that at the 2000 NPT Review Conference states
argued for a wide variety of definitions of this principle, it
will be difficult to reach a consensus on a package of specific
transparency steps.  But the Final Document does indicate
that a consensus exists on the need for actions to implement
the principle, even if different nuclear weapon states do so in
different ways.
Recommendations
• The NWS should provide annual declarations on the
following to increase transparency and build confidence:
— their total current numbers of nuclear warheads and
delivery systems;
— their current projected level of arsenals at the next NPT
Review Conference;
— the numbers and yield of their nuclear warheads and
delivery systems eliminated under Article VI;
— their plans for the development and deployment of
missile defences, and indications of the nature, location
and scope of such defences;
— their fissile material inventories and plans to place
excess fissile materials under international inspection;
and
— their plans for the elimination of nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicles.
• The above information could be submitted to a register,
perhaps maintained by the UN.
• The NWS should open testing sites and other nuclear-
weapon-related facilities to international inspection.
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9c.  Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons
‘— The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral
part of the nuclear arms reductions and disarmament process.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 9, third item]
Negotiating history
This is the first time that the Final Document of an NPT
Review Conference has referred to non-strategic weapons in
the context of Article VI. The text had several origins:
concerns expressed by Finland and Kyrgyzstan at the 1997
PrepCom session; a NAC formulation in 1998; and in 2000
the EU working paper presented to MC.I
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.5); the NATO-5 working paper
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.7); and a short working paper
submitted by Finland (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/WP.3).
During discussions of the 9 May draft, Russia wished to
insert a phrase limiting reductions in non-strategic nuclear
weapons to unilateral measures in the context of strategic
stability, while others wished to keep the text of the 9 May
draft or add a reference to the alternatives of bilateral or
multilateral measures.
In the 15 May draft, the 9 May text was altered from ‘in
a transparent and irreversible manner leading to their total
elimination as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction
and disarmament process and in the context of strategic
stability,’ to ‘based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral
part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.’
The latter has to be read in conjunction with the introductory
lines in paragraph 9.
Interpretations
Traditionally, the term ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons’
applies to the nuclear weapons not covered by the
US-Russian START and Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
(INF) treaties. The text also contains two other phrases which
are rather more opaque: ‘based on’ and ‘and as an integral
part.’ ‘[B]ased on’ may be read as intending to imply that
actions are mainly expected to take the form of unilateral
measures, but they could possibly be bi- or multilateral.  ‘As
an integral part of’ appears to imply an imperative to not only
take unilateral actions on these weapons, but also to include
them in both informal and formal negotiations and
agreements.  It should also be noted that although it is
qualified to some extent by the heading, the commitment is a
direct call for action.
Problems of defining ‘non-strategic nuclear weapons’
may occur in the case of China, France and the UK, the NWS
not party to the START and INF treaties. France, for example,
regards its air-launched missiles as strategic, while the UK
has stated that its strategic missiles may also have a
non-strategic role.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – further unilateral and bilateral
reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons.
• Positive steps – dialogue on further reduction and
transparency measures; implementation of the 1991–92
Russia–US presidential nuclear initiatives through an
arrangement that provides assurance that the initiatives
have been fulfilled.
• No movement – no dialogue; no moves towards
discussions on this issue.
• Outright non-fulfilment – re-deployment or deployment of
non-strategic nuclear weapons.
• Other actions – negotiations on a global treaty aimed at the
reduction or elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons,
as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and
disarmament process.
Political realities
The 1991–92 Russia–US presidential nuclear initiatives in
this area had no verification mechanism attached to them.
This class of weapons, currently only covered by an informal
arms control regime, is not subject to transparency,
accountability or verification, and thus there is no
authoritative information in the public domain on total
numbers of weapons in this category (see also 9b, above).
Recommendations
The Russia and the US should:
• implement the 1991–92 Russia–US presidential nuclear
initiatives;
• consolidate and codify the 1991–92 Russia–US
presidential nuclear initiatives in a form that provides a
degree of transparency that would ensure irreversibility or
at least assurance of implementation;
• consider further steps to reduce non-strategic weapons in
Europe, either in isolation or as part of an overall
negotiated elimination of all non-strategic nuclear
weapons;
• draw up inventories of holdings of non-strategic nuclear
weapons as part of this process;
• make a commitment not to increase numbers of deployed
weapons;
• consider reductions in such weapons in the context of
future negotiated agreements; and
• increase dialogue on such matters.
The NATO countries and Russia should:
• introduce a data exchange on deployment, storage and
numbers of such weapons in Europe; and
• take steps to increase the transparency and accountability
regarding the non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed on
their territory.
All NWS should:
• be encouraged to introduce additional transparency
measures on their nuclear non-strategic nuclear weapons;
and
• be urged to start a discourse on constraining the total
numbers of their weapons.
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9d.  Operational Status
‘— Concrete and agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 9, fourth item]
Negotiating history
This had its origins in paragraph 5 of the NAC-sponsored
1998 UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution
(A/RES/53/77Y). At the start of the second week of the
Conference, the NWS announced the de-targeting of their
strategic systems in their joint statement. The NAC wished
them to go beyond this by removing warheads, in order to
reduce levels of alertness (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3).
Also of relevance were proposals that had been discussed in
the START III context between Russia and the US.
During talks over the draft of 9 May, Russia wanted the
paragraph on operational status to be deleted. China wanted
no reference to specific measures and sought the addition of
references to withdrawing systems to the territory of the
possessor-state and eliminating nuclear sharing. Egypt,
Ireland, Mexico, and South Africa proposed to have the
paragraph commit the NWS to the early withdrawal of all
nuclear forces from active deployment in order to maintain
strategic stability while nuclear weapons were eliminated.
The US tried to limit the commitment to the removal of
nuclear warheads from delivery systems slated for
elimination. In addition, the UK and the US sought to
condition withdrawal of nuclear forces from deployment by
references to strategic stability.
As a result of these disagreements, this paragraph was
completely changed and shortened in the 15 May draft.
‘Measures to de-alert and de-activate nuclear weapons
systems, the removal of nuclear warheads from delivery
vehicles and the withdrawal of nuclear forces from active
deployment for the maintenance and promotion of strategic
stability,’ became ‘Concrete and agreed measures to further
reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.’
Interpretations
The phrase ‘concrete and agreed measures’ appears to have
been inserted to serve two different purposes.  On the one
hand, some states intended that the measures should be
specific, and thus transparent and hard to reverse. On the other
hand, the text reflects the reality that the nuclear powers will
need to work out such measures between themselves and to
be convinced that such steps are consistent with strategic
stability. The use of the phrase ‘reduce the operational status’
overcame the reluctance of some NWS to agree to specific
measures in the original text, as it leaves flexibility as to the
actions that can be taken in this context.
Levels of fulfilment
A number of meaningful benchmarks for measuring
fulfilment stand out, which are linked to a range of specific
options for action. The following general benchmarks
provide starting points for discussion of this complex issue.
• Complete fulfilment – some mix of measures to de-target,
de-alert, de-mate or de-activate nuclear weapons systems,
possibly combined with transparency measures for
providing confidence in their implementation.
• Positive steps – individual measures to de-target, de-alert,
de-mate or de-activate nuclear weapons systems.
• No movement – no changes in the operational status of
nuclear weapons.
• Outright non-fulfilment – actions to reverse steps already
taken towards reducing the operational status of nuclear
weapons. Any actions that increase operational status.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
None of the NWS currently engages in a comprehensive and
directed policy of de-alerting.  In practice, however, a
significant percentage of their nuclear forces are no longer on
alert. In their joint statements, all the NWS stated that they
no longer ‘target each other’, though the existence of rapid
re-targeting capabilities makes this largely a symbolic step.
At the same time, de-alerting remains a controversial subject
in the US, though the Nuclear Posture Review suggests that
this may be changing. Arguments persist that de-alerting
could generate instabilities, rather than greater stability.  For
their part, Russian planners may feel under pressure to retain
a prompt launch-on-warning posture, due to the deterioration
of early warning systems, greater reliance on inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and the US administra-
tion’s plans to deploy missile defences.  Nevertheless, some
actions by the NWS could be regarded as involving a positive
policy of de-alerting, such as the announced UK reduced level
of alert on its single nuclear system. However, this is based
on changes in operational procedures that can easily be
reversed.
Recommendations
• The NWS collectively should be encouraged to take the
following steps in order to implement this paragraph:
— de-activate warheads from all systems that they are
planning to dismantle or eliminate, unilaterally or
through agreement;
— keep only a minimum number of nuclear weapons on
high alert status;
— develop transparency measures for changes in
operational status; and
— initiate joint discussions of possible changes to reduce
the operational status of their nuclear-weapons
systems, with a remit to report their conclusions to the
2005 NPT Review Conference and/or the CD.
• Furthermore, Russia and the US should be encouraged to
undertake the following steps:
— establish a high-level Joint Commission to identify
specific actions to reduce the operational status of their
nuclear forces, with a commitment to the
implementation of such recommendations;
— initiate an initial limited duration ‘experiment’ with the
de-alerting or de-activation of some systems, both to
test how to do so and to include possible transparency
measures;
— cease day-to-day planning for nuclear warfare with
each other;
— remove one leg of their nuclear triad; and
— retire the technical mechanisms to launch a nuclear
strike immediately (i.e., the so-called ‘footballs’)
entailing their constant presence near the heads of state
of Russia and the US.
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9e.  A Diminishing Role for Nuclear Weapons
‘— A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimise the risk that these weapons might
ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 9, fifth item]
Negotiating history
This originated in the 1998 and 1999 NAC resolutions in the
UNGA, and a Canadian proposal at the Conference
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.4).
During discussions of the 9 May draft, several
amendments were proposed to this paragraph, such as
changing the language from ‘minimise’ to ‘preclude,’ and
adding ‘threats to use’ to ‘use.’ In addition, France wanted it
deleted on the grounds that national security policies were
national responsibilities, not issues for the Review
Conference to address, while Russia expressed substantial
reservations over it.
In the 15 May draft, the existence of the heading (see 9,
above) meant that ‘[weapons] ever be used, to facilitate the
process of elimination, to enhance strategic stability and to
contribute to international confidence and security,’ could be
shortened to ‘[weapons] will ever be used and to facilitate the
process of their total elimination.’
Interpretations
A ‘diminishing role’ could be interpreted as a process of
reducing the significance of nuclear weapons in defence
policies. This makes arriving at consensus on the benchmarks
for measuring whether or not states are fulfilling this
commitment extremely difficult.  For example, actions that
would demonstrate that you were moving to such a
diminishing role might include: movement over postures and
doctrine, such as no-first use declarations, or abandonment of
deterrence doctrines; reductions in weapon numbers; and
reductions in preparedness.
Levels of fulfilment
In the light of the above, there are a wide range of alternative
benchmarks, which  might include:
• Complete fulfilment - a decision by the NWS not to include
the possession and use of nuclear weapons in their strategic
plans. A shift in doctrine from deterrence to reassurance.3
Changes in the operational status of nuclear weapons.
Declarations on no-first use backed up by appropriate
changes in strategic doctrine and the configuration and
alert status of nuclear forces.  A no-first use posture.  Steps
to move inter-state relationships in a non-adversarial
direction.
• Positive steps – the indication by NWS of the steps they
are taking to pursue a diminishing role for nuclear
weapons. Commitments not to develop and deploy new
nuclear warheads. Efforts by the NWS to rethink their
strategic doctrines, to consider alternatives to nuclear
deterrence, and to seek to move beyond this concept. The
diminution of the role of nuclear weapons as a result of
their replacement by existing and/or new conventional
weapons.
• No movement – no change in the role of nuclear weapons
in security policies and no attempt to rethink nuclear
doctrine.
• Outright non-fulfilment – steps by the NWS to increase the
overall role of nuclear weapons in their security policies,
or place a more visible emphasis on the importance of
nuclear weapons in dealing with a wide range of threats.
The announcement of new nuclear doctrine that makes this
clear.
• Other actions – bilateral and multilateral discussions of
respective nuclear doctrines among the NWS.
Political realities
Political realities make it difficult to expect rapid steps
towards fulfilment of this recommendation. Many security
analysts and defence planners in the NATO, Russia and the
US remain committed to the concept of nuclear deterrence.
This is confirmed by their current defence postures, in which
the logic of deterrence still figures prominently, even if
characterised as being of ‘last resort’.
Recommendations
• NATO’s report entitled NATO’s Role in the Future:
Options for CSBMs, Verification, Non-Proliferation, Arms
Control and Disarmament which was made public in
December 2000, outlined a number of useful confidence-
and security-building measures (CSBMs) that could lead
to a dialogue between NATO and Russia over nuclear
doctrines. These included data exchanges on the
following:
— the alert status of nuclear forces;
— nuclear safety issues; and
— Russian and US non-strategic nuclear forces.
• In addition to the NATO proposals, the following
measures could be promoted:
— Russia and the US could be encouraged to make clear
their commitment to put in place a non-adversarial
relationship in which deterrence would no longer be a
central concept;
— Russia and the US could take concrete steps to lessen
operational reliance on nuclear weapons, such as
standing down weapons earmarked for dismantlement
under START II;
— all the NWS could reassess their nuclear doctrines, and
reappraise the costs and benefits of adopting a no-first
use policy and the advantages of de-alerting;
— by seeking the universal application of the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) and rigorously
pursuing their compliance and enforcement, the
perceived need for nuclear deterrence in the context of
threats from other weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) would be reduced; and
— a study could be initiated by experts from the NWS, to
identify the steps through which a diminished role of
nuclear weapons might be facilitated.
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9f.  The Process of Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons
‘— The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon states in the process
leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 9, sixth item]
Negotiating history
This has its origins in a long-standing NAM4 proposal calling
for the NWS to engage in plurilateral negotiations on the total
elimination of nuclear weapons. The immediate stimulus was
that it followed on from a proposal on START (i.e., bilateral
disarmament negotiations) in the NAC working paper
(NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3), and was intended to be the
next stage in nuclear disarmament.
In the 15 May draft, ‘The integration at an early and
appropriate stage of all the nuclear-weapon States in the
process [leading]’ found in an earlier text became ‘The
engagement as soon as appropriate [leading].’
Interpretations
This commitment is aimed at binding the three NWS with the
smallest arsenals into the elimination process.  The phrase ‘as
soon as appropriate’ appears to refer to the stage at which all
NWS would become involved in the elimination process.
One interpretation is that this implies some threshold number
of Russian and US nuclear weapons at which China, France
and the UK would join the reductions process.  Another
interpretation is that they should become involved when
serious negotiations start on total elimination, and that this
should be the stimulus for their action, not any specific
threshold.
In practice, this appears to be less a stand-alone
commitment and more an indicator of how the process of total
elimination might proceed, and the wish that the three smaller
NWS should be part of it.  Also, a commitment to engage in
‘the process leading to’ implies actual negotiations on total
elimination, not just undefined steps leading to that goal.
Levels of fulfilment
This paragraph is seen not so much as calling for a specific
action but as saying that all NWS should participate in the
elimination of nuclear weapons. It does not directly refer to
the process of elimination, and would seem to leave a range
of possible actions.
• Complete fulfilment – integration of all of the NWS into
the nuclear disarmament process, leading to actual
agreements among them on steps towards the total
elimination of nuclear weapons.
• Positive steps – dialogue among some NWS on how to
bring all five NWS into the nuclear disarmament process,
as well as possible dialogue on what the process leading to
total elimination might entail in areas such as ways and
means of elimination, transparency and verification.
• No movement – no clear indication of intention to engage
in discussions among the NWS on how to integrate all of
them into the nuclear disarmament process.
• Outright non-fulfilment – rejection by one or more of the
NWS of their possible participation in the nuclear
disarmament process, or increases in the size or
effectiveness of a nuclear arsenal.
• Other actions – bilateral or trilateral agreements between
China, France and the UK, running parallel to START.
Consideration of other issues, such as enhanced
transparency and verification of the size of NWS nuclear
arsenals.
Political realities
Since this paragraph was agreed upon, in 2000, there have
been significant changes in the relationship between the
NWS, not least the announcement by the US that it intends to
abrogate the ABM Treaty.  Prior to this, China, France and
the UK had a range of nuanced positions indicating that their
future participation in a plurilateral elimination process was
dependent on further Russian and the US reductions.
However, movement in the traditional Russian-US bilateral
reductions process is now challenged by the US decision on
the ABM Treaty and by disagreement over the form any such
agreement should take.  How this commitment would be
implemented in the new situation where the future strategic
framework is unknown remains unclear.  Unless and until it
is in place, it is widely seen as unlikely that China, France and
the UK will be prepared to engage in discussions on an
elimination process.
Recommendation
• The NWS should consider a variety of bilateral and multi-
lateral CSBMs, including dialogue and data exchanges.
10.  Surplus Material
‘Arrangements by all nuclear weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by
each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international
verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such
material remains permanently outside military programmes.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 10]
Negotiating history
This paragraph originated from language submitted by some
NAC members and others to MC.II (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.II/WP.1) and also by NAC members to MC.I (NPT/
CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.3). This made a call to place ‘nuclear
fissile material transferred from military use…under appro-
priate IAEA verification arrangements in the framework of
… voluntary safeguards’.  It was emphasised that the
transfers should be irreversible. This text underwent
significant modification in the course of the Conference. The
reference to voluntary safeguards was withdrawn as this
implied reversibility. The text was later modified by insertion
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of the phrase ‘as soon as practicable’, by changing
‘safeguards’ to ‘verifi- cation,’ and by removing all
references to irreversibility.
Interpretations
This applies to the NWS only, not the nuclear-capable states
outside the Treaty. Each state can decide what it would
designate as surplus to requirements. However, once
arrangements are made for the disposition of weapons grade
fissile material, the principle of irreversibility applies, given
that the paragraph calls for states to ‘ensure that such material
remains permanently outside of military programmes.’
Levels of fulfilment
It is difficult to establish what actions would constitute
outright non-fulfilment of this provision.
• Complete fulfilment – unilateral steps by the NWS to
arrange for the transfer of stocks of excess material from
their military stockpiles and efforts to involve the IAEA or
other relevant international verification instruments in
verifying that excess quantities do not return to military
use.
• Positive steps – announcement of measures for the
disposition of stocks of excess material.
• No movement – none of the above.
• Outright non-fulfilment – statement of an intention not to
accept this recommendation. Reversal of previous
decisions to designate weapons grade material for peaceful
purposes and movement of materials back into military
programmes.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
China and France have not designated any of their stocks of
fissile material as surplus to military requirements.  Russia
and the US are engaged in negotiations with the IAEA on
creating a regime, which would be the precursor to placing
all their surplus fissile material in military stocks under
Agency safeguards.
Recommendations
• A debate over how and where surplus materials should be
stored should be instigated, keeping the principle of
irreversibility in mind.
• Further studies of how to dispose of excess weapons
plutonium in a way that is both safe, and renders it out of
reach for future military uses, should be undertaken.
• Financial and technical assistance to implement this
process should be provided to those states that require it,
but only after they have offered up the material and
agreement has been reached as to how and where it is
secured.
11.  General and Complete Disarmament
‘Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and
complete disarmament under effective international control.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 11]
Negotiating history
This was introduced as a new subparagraph into the 15 May
draft. Its origins may have lain in a French proposal for
alternative wording for subparagraph 6, which read ‘An
unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to the
ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons consistent with
Article VI of the NPT.’ For some states, subparagraph 6 was
only acceptable because of this text.
Interpretations
General and complete disarmament has traditionally been
understood as the reduction of national armed forces to a level
consistent with national security needs, and the provision of
armed forces to the UN. The concept of general and complete
disarmament dates back to 1954, when France and the UK
put forward a plan for nuclear arms reductions leading to a
total prohibition on all weapons of mass destruction. Central
to the debates of that period was the relationship between
conventional and nuclear forces, and the relationship between
them in the nuclear reductions process. In Article VI of the
NPT, the call was made for both nuclear disarmament and
general and complete disarmament. This has given rise to
long and inconclusive debates at NPT Conferences over
whether nuclear disarmament is conditional upon general and
complete disarmament, or whether it should be treated as a
separate issue and implemented in isolation.
The appearance of this subheading as a separate
commitment appeared to achieve some clarification of this
issue by separating nuclear disarmament steps in the text from
conventional disarmament actions. This is significant, given
that the linkage has been used by the NWS to justify their
retention of nuclear weapons until general and complete
disarmament has been achieved.
Levels of fulfilment
This is a reaffirmation of a principle. The question of levels
of fulfilment does not apply.
Political realities
The idea that nuclear disarmament and general and complete
disarmament are interdependent is one which has been widely
supported since the disarmament debates of the 1950s. It is
therefore not surprising that this interrelationship was present
in the text of the NPT.
Recommendation
Again, as this is a reaffirmation of a principle, the question of
recommendations does not apply.
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12.  Reporting
‘Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty,
by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the Decision on 
‘Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament’, and recalling the advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice on 8 July 1996.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 12]
Negotiating history
This provision originated in a proposal from the NAM (NPT/
CONF.2000/18). It caused disagreements principally
between a group of eight mainly NAC states, which supported
annual reports, and the NWS (with the exception of China)
and Japan, which favoured just ‘reporting’. In addition,
Ghana, Iran and Malaysia wished to see a reference to the
obligations affirmed by the ICJ decision of 1996 in this
paragraph.  The text was amended in two respects from the 9
May version. The first part of the sentence was changed from
‘Annual reports within the framework of the review process
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’
to ‘Regular reports, within the framework of the strengthened
review process for the Non-Proliferation Treaty.’ Secondly,
‘and recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court
of Justice of 8 July 1996’, was added to the end of the
sentence.
Interpretations
This text refers to reports by states on their progress towards
the fulfilment of Article VI. This provision was reinforced by
the advisory opinion of the ICJ in July 1996.
The reports are to be mandatory, although there are
questions as to the intended content of such reports, and
whether they are to be made by all states parties, or just the
NWS. The original text was amended from requiring ‘annual
reports’ because, under the strengthened review process,
there would be only four meetings every five years. This
amendment makes it clear that the intention was that the
report should be made to both PrepComs and Review
Conferences. Although there is no specific mention of any
commitment by the NWS to report on their implementation
of the ‘practical steps’ contained in the Final Document of the
2000 NPT Review Conference, such reports could be
interpreted as an elucidation of paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995
Principles and Objectives.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – regular updates by all states on the
actions they have taken towards fulfilment of Article VI of
the NPT and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Principles and
Objectives.
• Positive steps – regular updates on some, but not all, of the
commitments contained in the two documents listed
above.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – refusal to provide a report, or the
provision of an inaccurate report that makes false claims.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
The NWS have all voluntarily provided reports on their
compliance with article VI to NPT review meetings since
1997. However, these reports have not been uniform in
format.
Although reporting now appears to be mandatory, it is
probable that the NWS will seek to report on positive
movement, but not on areas where progress is lacking. They
may therefore be reluctant to systematically address all of the
commitments in the Final Document, and thus expose
themselves to allegations of non-fulfilment.
Recommendation
• A UN experts’ study on the form and content of the reports,
with a possible annex on ways and means by which their
accuracy and relevance could be checked, may be helpful.
13.  Verification Capabilities
‘The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance 
of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a
nuclear-weapon-free world.’
[Article VI etc., paragraph 15, sub-paragraph 13]
Negotiating history
This was a UK formulation to support its unilateral initiative
in this area (NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/WP.6). It originated in
an earlier NAC proposal. During negotiations in the
subsidiary body over the 9 May draft, Austria, Ireland, and
South Africa sought to have the IAEA develop the relevant
verification capabilities, and Ireland wished to see it linked
to the elimination of nuclear weapons and the maintenance
of a nuclear-weapon-free world (NWFW). China reserved its
position.
The text changed considerably in the 15 May draft. The
words ‘nationally, bilaterally, multilaterally, and through the
relevant international organisations,’ which had originally
been the third and fourth words of the subparagraph, were
deleted. Also, what originally read ‘the confidence and
assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament
obligations’ was expanded to read ‘assurance of compliance
with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement
and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.’
Interpretations
This provision relates to current and future verification
requirements, i.e. verification to ensure compliance with
existing arms control treaties, and developments in verifica-
tion techniques that will facilitate ‘the achievement and
maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.’ The reference
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to the latter makes this a radical provision, looking ahead to
the verification of the end game of nuclear disarmament.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the further development of verifica-
tion capabilities, which provide assurance of compliance
with a) existing arms control and disarmament agreements,
and b) the achievement and maintenance of a NWFW.
• Positive steps – positive steps to develop further
verification capabilities relating to existing arms control
and disarmament agreements.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment - no positive developments in
verification measures for either a) or b) above. Any actions
that undermine verification efforts.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
The activities of the IAEA are hampered by a limited budget,
which could undermine its efforts to verify compliance with
existing treaties, and its ability to develop verification
procedures to provide assurance of compliance with future
agreements. However, the UK has continued to sustain its
unilateral technical programme in this area.
Progress in the area is vital in order to boost confidence
in unilateral, bilateral and multilateral disarmament measures
and agreements.
Recommendation
• UN or CD experts’ studies could contribute to research into
the technological and the administrative/procedural
aspects of verification.
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Part II: Nuclear Non-Proliferation
This part covers five key issues: safeguards; export controls;
compliance; security assurances and NWFZs; and physical
protection.  The approach is similar to that of Part I on
‘Nuclear Disarmament and the 13 Steps’, with the exception
that a general negotiating history is provided at the beginning
of each section, rather than a specific negotiating history for
each paragraph cited.
14.  Safeguards
Negotiating history
IAEA safeguards were discussed in Main Committee II
(MC.II) of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Strong support
for the implementation and strengthening of Agency
safeguards is reflected in the large number of proposals
relating to this issue contained in the Final Document.
Although the safeguards issue was less controversial than
some others discussed in MC.II, there were still
disagreements between various states parties over the signing
and bringing into force of the 1997 additional protocol
(known as the ‘INFCIRC/540’ protocol after the information
circular in which it was first published), and whether its
ratification by a state should be a condition of supply.
There was disappointment amongst some states parties
over the sluggish pace at which states have signed and/or
ratified the additional protocol. In their statement on the
subject, the NWS urged all NNWS to sign the additional
protocol and stated that they were in the process of seeking
ratification of their own agreements. The NAM working
paper (NPT/CONF.2000/18), while endorsing the IAEA
safeguards regime and supporting full-scope safeguards as a
necessary pre-condition for new supply arrangements, made
no mention of the additional protocol.
14a.  Voluntary-offer Safeguards
‘The Conference stresses that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally
applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved. In the meantime, the
Conference calls for the wider application of safeguards to civil nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon
States under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements in the most economic way possible, taking
into account the availability of IAEA resources.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 12]
Interpretations
The reference to nuclear-weapon states in this paragraph
relates to the five, legally recognised NWS only. It cannot
include India, Israel and Pakistan since they are not parties to
the NPT. If they were it would be as NNWS as only those
states that ‘exploded…a nuclear device prior to 1 January
1967’ are deemed to be NWS.
The paragraph might be read as implying that the NWS
are under no obligation to accept the application of safeguards
on their facilities until complete elimination has taken place.
This, however, was not the intention of the paragraph, which
should be interpreted as a call to the NWS that have not yet
done so to place all civil nuclear installations under
voluntary-offer safeguards. It also alludes to the fact that the
Agency’s resources are extremely limited.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all representative civil nuclear
installations are placed under voluntary-offer safeguards
by NWS that have not yet done so, and the Agency is
provided with the necessary funds.
• Positive steps – the list of facilities to which the IAEA is
given access is extended and/or additional contributions
are made to the Agency’s budget for this purpose.
• No movement – no additional facilities are added to the
list.
• Outright non-fulfilment – facilities are withdrawn from the
list. Access to listed facilities is refused.
• Other actions – installations are closed.
Political realities
The placement of civil nuclear installations and materials in
the NWS under IAEA safeguards is complicated by financial
considerations. The resources needed to put all civil nuclear
facilities in China, Russia and the US under IAEA safeguards
may be comparable to the entire current annual budget of the
IAEA Department of Safeguards. (Civil nuclear facilities and
material in France and the UK are already under Euratom
safeguards). China, Russia and the US have presented lists of
installations for possible application of Agency safeguards.
However, the prospects for action in this area are not
promising as the IAEA is reported to lack even the resources
needed to apply the required safeguards measures, including
round-the-clock inspection, at Japan’s new spent-fuel
reprocessing facility.
Many states believe the NWS should pay for applying
safeguards to their civil nuclear installations. However, if it
should be decided that the costs of implementing voluntary
safeguards offers were to be funded entirely by the NWS
themselves, France and the UK might be expected to object,
as they are already paying for the application of IAEA
safeguards to their civil facilities via Euratom safeguards.
Recommendations
• All NWS should submit to international safeguards a
representative sample of their nuclear facilities.
• Means should be found to fund the safeguarding of the
above.
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14b.  Safeguards: Effectiveness & Efficiency
‘The Conference reaffirms that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions
adopted by IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the
efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 16]
Interpretations
This proposal originates from paragraph 11 of the 1995
Principles and Objectives. It can be divided into three parts.
First, it reaffirms the need to adapt the application of Agency
safeguards as circumstances dictate, and calls for regular
assessment and evaluation. Second, the reference to ‘further
strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency
of IAEA safeguards’ implies that the IAEA safeguards
system should be further developed and applied in as
streamlined a fashion as possible, without impairing their
ability to achieve the necessary level of confidence. Third,
the phrase ‘…IAEA safeguards should be supported and
implemented’ would seem to be a call to states under Agency
safeguards to facilitate their application, including the nom-
ination procedures for safeguards inspectors. It also appears
to be requesting that states in a position to do so, should
contribute to the development of safeguards implementation
techniques.
The appropriate body to assess and evaluate both the
safeguards system and the way the Agency’s Secretariat
applies it is the Board of Governors. This has empowered a
special body, the Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards
Implementation (SAGSI), to make appropriate assessments
and evaluations.5 SAGSI meets regularly and reports to the
Director General.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the IAEA regularly assesses and
evaluates safeguards, to ensure that the effectiveness and
efficiency of safeguards with regard to particularly compli-
cated plants, such as bulk-material-handling facilities, is
improved. States facilitate the application of safeguards,
and states in a position to do so, contribute to the
development of safeguards implementation techniques.
• Positive steps – the effectiveness and efficiency of the
safeguards application methods are increased on specific
installations in individual states.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – the IAEA fails to regularly
assess and evaluate safeguards and fails to apply them in
the most efficient and effective way possible. States
prevent or hamper the application of safeguards.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
During 2000, the IAEA Secretariat took steps intended to
strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of the
safeguards system in six areas:
• agency access to, and evaluation of, substantially more
information than previously available to the Agency about
states’ nuclear and nuclear-related activities;
• increased safeguards access to locations in a state;
• advances in safeguards technology and verification
procedures;
• increased cooperation with state and regional systems of
accounting and control of nuclear material;
• safeguards training; and
• integrated safeguards.
Although some progress in these areas has been possible
despite economic constraints, the Agency remains concerned
about the continuing inadequacy of the regular budget, and
about its enforced reliance on extra-budgetary resources for
the development of safeguards.
At the national level, the majority of states that have not
signed a standard IAEA safeguards agreement for NPT state
parties (known as an ‘INFCIRC/153’ agreement after the
information circular in which it was first published) do not
have significant nuclear activities, and therefore do not feel
that this is a priority, despite the fact that a simplified model
safeguards agreement has been devised for them, greatly
facilitating the procedures involved.6  The additional
protocol to the standard safeguards agreement has been
generally well received, but, to date, has only 61 signatories
and 24 contracting parties.
Recommendations
• States should encourage other states to adopt the additional
protocol.
• States that have yet to adopt an INFCIRC/153
comprehensive safeguards agreement could adopt the
additional protocol at the same time as concluding this
agreement.
• Small, joint delegations from, for example, Australia,
Japan, and the EU, could visit the states in question to urge
their governments to conclude safeguards agreements and,
on request, assist them with this process.
• The Agency should accelerate the development and
implementation of integrated safeguards to lower the cost
of safeguarding specific types of installation, without
reducing its quality.
• Seminars or workshops should be organised to exchange
experiences of concluding safeguards agreements. The
aim would be to encourage additional states to conclude
such agreements, and to dispel concerns about their
application.
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14c.  The IAEA & Financial Constraints
‘The Conference notes the considerable increase in the Agency’s safeguards responsibilities since 1995. It
further notes the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards system is functioning and calls upon
all States parties, noting their common but differentiated responsibilities, to continue their political, technical
and financial support of IAEA in order to ensure that the Agency is able to meet its safeguards
responsibilities.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 30]
Interpretations
This paragraph has a number of ambiguities. It would seem
to call for an increase in the Agency’s regular budget (i.e.
departing from the ‘zero-growth’ policy) but might also be
taken to mean that states which can afford to do so should
make greater contributions to the Agency’s technical
assistance activities. As there has been a political
understanding that the safeguards and technical assistance
budgets should be of a similar magnitude, this could have the
effect of indirectly adding to the funds available for
safeguards.  In mentioning ‘technical’ support, it seems to
hint that states should continue to make extra-budgetary
funds available for safeguards development. The mention of
political support is open to various interpretations. These may
include: support for safeguards in the Board of Governors and
the General Conference; full cooperation in accrediting
inspectors; assisting the application of safeguards;
nominating competent nationals for service as safeguards
inspectors; and accepting more stringent safeguards measures
if these can be shown to lead to greater effectiveness.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – states pay their contributions to the
regular and operational budgets and, those that can afford
to do so, make greater contributions to the Agency’s tech-
nical assistance and safeguards development activities.
• Positive steps – states pay their contributions to the regular
and operational budgets.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states default on their regular
budget payments and/or fail to make their assessed
contributions to the operational budget.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
The IAEA is facing mounting financial pressures, as
acknowledged in this paragraph. The likelihood is that this
trend will continue as the strengthened safeguards system is
implemented and safeguards responsibilities are increasing.
Among the consequences of the shortage are:
• the inability to carry out a portion of mandatory
inspections;
• growing dependency on extra-budgetary contributions to
make up for shortfalls in the regular safeguards budget;
• difficulties in implementing the additional protocol and
outstanding comprehensive safeguards agreements as the
costs outstrip the resources available; and
• continuation of the Agency’s established zero-growth
policy.
The political and technical constraints on the IAEA’s safe-
guards system should also be noted. Some countries may find
safeguards overly burdensome, whilst others tend to consider
them ineffective. The application of Agency safeguards is
also said to be hampered by a shortage of qualified inspectors,
as those best equipped to fill such positions may be attracted
to better-paid jobs and longer-term career prospects in
industry. Considerations such as the burden of international
removals, children’s schooling, and the problem of employed
spouses having to give up their jobs also play a part.
Recommendations
• The rationalisation of safeguards approaches and
techniques to keep the cost of safeguards application as
low as possible without affecting its efficacy.
• The introduction of integrated safeguards should be
accelerated as this may reduce current costs and thus put
less pressure on IAEA resources.
14d.  The Additional Protocol
‘The Conference welcomes the fact that since May 1997, the IAEA Board of Governors has approved
additional protocols to comprehensive safeguards agreements with 43 States and that 12 of those additional
protocols are currently being implemented. The Conference encourages all States parties, in particular those
States parties with substantial nuclear programmes, to conclude additional protocols as soon as possible
and to bring them into force or provisionally apply them as soon as possible.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 45]
Interpretations
This is a call to all states to bring into force, or provisionally
apply, the additional protocol as soon as possible, especially
NNWS with substantial nuclear programmes.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – entry into force/provisional
application of the additional protocol by all NNWS with
substantial nuclear programmes.
• Positive steps – entry into force/provisional application of
the additional protocol by NNWS that do not have substan-
tial nuclear programmes, and signature of the additional
protocol by some NNWS with substantial nuclear
programmes.
• No movement – no new signatures or implementation of
the additional protocol.
• Outright non-fulfilment – statements by NPT parties that
they have no plans to sign or implement the additional
protocol.
• Other actions – signature and entry into force of an
additional protocol with the IAEA by non-parties.
Political realities
The additional protocol was conceived to reinforce the
standard safeguards agreement contained in INFCIRC/153,
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by enabling the Agency to take all necessary steps to ensure
that the state’s declarations are complete and correct.
However, some states seem to see the additional protocol as
imposing a further burden, including a potential infringement
of their sovereignty, and therefore hesitate to accede to it.
Recommendations
• States that have not yet done so should sign and/or ratify
the additional protocol.
• States that are in the position to do so should offer
assistance to these states in concluding and implementing
the additional protocol.
14e.  Safeguards Assistance
‘The Conference recommends that the Director General of IAEA and the IAEA member States consider ways
and means, which could include a possible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion and entry
into force of such safeguards agreements and additional protocols, including, for example, specific measures
to assist States with less experience in nuclear activities to implement legal requirements.’
[Article III etc., paragraph 47]
Interpretations
Experience has shown that some states have difficulty in
approving safeguards agreements, bringing them into force
and drafting and adopting the appropriate legislation that
should make their implementation possible. This may result
in a situation where, without any ill will on the part of the
state, the Agency finds itself unable to apply safeguards.
Given the necessary funds, to cover such items as travel, the
Secretariat should be able to assist states in this respect, at
relatively modest expense.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the Director General and the IAEA
member states consider ways and means, including a poss-
ible plan of action, to promote and facilitate the conclusion
and entry into force of safeguards and additional protocols.
• Positive steps – the Director General or the IAEA member
states consider ways and means to promote and facilitate
the above.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – no attempt is made by the
Director General or the IAEA member states to consider
ways and means to promote and facilitate the above.
• Other actions – a study on this issue by an NGO or private
consultant. An effort by a nuclear-weapon-free zone
(NWFZ) secretariat — OPANAL, the South Pacific
Forum, ABACC, etc. — to help states approve safeguards
agreements and bring them into force.
Political realities
This potentially useful suggestion merits follow-up but, given
the current workload upon the Secretariat and the shortage of
necessary funds, extra-budgetary funds might have to be
sought to ensure follow-up. It should be noted that the Board
of Governors cannot make new funds or staff available
without a mandate from the General Conference.
Recommendations
• The Director General should prepare proposals for ways
and means, including a plan of action, to ‘promote and
facilitate the conclusion and entry into force of such
safeguards agreements and additional protocols.’
• The Board should adopt a plan of action on this issue.
• Elements of a plan of action might include a pledging
conference to encourage states to sign and implement the
additional protocol.
• A plan of action might also include the identification and
effective publicising by the IAEA of the incentives for
states to sign and ratify the protocol. Examples might be:
— preferential treatment in areas such as technical
assistance;
— help in drafting and adopting the necessary legislation;
— assistance in upgrading the infrastructure of national
nuclear material accountancy and control; and
— Agency help in arranging assistance with delicate
operations, which states lack the means of handling
themselves, such as the removal, reprocessing and/or
storage of irradiated fuel and highly radioactive waste.
14f.  The Civil Plutonium Management Guidelines & Highly Enriched Uranium
‘The Conference encourages all States that separate, hold, process or use separated plutonium in their civil
nuclear activities to adopt policies similar to those which have been adopted by the participants in the
Plutonium Management Guidelines (INFCIRC/549). Furthermore, the Conference encourages the States
concerned to consider similar policies for the management of highly enriched uranium used for civil
purposes.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 55]
Interpretations
The Plutonium Management Guidelines (PMG) were
adopted in December 1997 by a group of nine states
(Belgium, China, France, Germany, Japan, the Russian
Federation, Switzerland, the UK and the US).
The  language in this paragraph is such as to leave room
for the proposal to be implemented by individual states or
groups of states, including regional organizations and the
IAEA itself.  While the first part of the paragraph does not
appear to be restricted to NPT parties as it refers to ‘all States’,
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the second part, which deals with the management of highly
enriched uranium (HEU), is addressed to ‘the States
concerned’, thus implying a more restricted focus.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – implementation of the PMG by all
states that use Pu in their civil nuclear activities. Active
consideration of a similar arrangement for the
management of HEU.
• Positive steps – implementation of the PMG by additional
states.
• No movement – no implementation of the PMG in
additional states. No discussions of a similar arrangement
for HEU.
• Outright non-fulfilment – actions by the original adherents
to the PMG to undermine the guidelines, such as a refusal
to implement them.
• Other actions – reviews of national policies for
management of Pu and HEU in civil nuclear activities.
Political realities
Although the PMG are applied by all NWS, and other states
such as India, Israel and Pakistan are also being encouraged
to do so, the process is voluntary, the aim being to establish
a transparency regime based on adherents’ goodwill.7
Pu and HEU are dealt with together in this paragraph
although, in practice, they pose different problems and for
this reason are usually dealt with separately. Nevertheless, in
their communication to the IAEA concerning this issue in
December 1997, seven of the nine states that adhere to the
PMG stated that they are in favour of adopting similar
guidelines for the management of HEU. China and Russia did
not express an opinion either way.  Consultations on the
question of extending the PMG to civil HEU were held during
2000. More recently, however, the group has taken the
decision not to address the HEU issue for the present.
Recommendations
• The PMG should be strengthened. Steps to achieve this
might include:8
— an obligation on adherents to submit their declarations
in a timely manner;
— greater emphasis on submitting complete declarations;
— releasing declarations to the public simultaneously
with submissions to the IAEA (this already takes place
in the UK); and
— providing separate declarations on military plutonium,
as appropriate.
• Additional states should be encouraged to accept the
guidelines. This might include discussions with:
— the Netherlands, Sweden and Italy;
— states that were part of the former USSR who have
jurisdiction over stocks of Pu;
— the DPRK; and
— India, Israel and Pakistan.
• Steps should be taken to progress discussions on HEU.
These might include:
— An NGO study elucidating the benefits of adopting a
similar informal transparency arrangement for HEU
and discussion of the political hurdles and practical
considerations involved; and
— the distribution of US findings about the advantages of
stopping the use of HEU in research reactors.
• Relevant states should be encouraged to:
— change the fuel of reactors currently using HEU into
low enriched uranium (LEU); and
— assist states to make this change in all relevant technical
and other ways.
15.  Safeguards & Export Controls
Negotiating history
Export controls were dealt with in both MC.II and MC.III,
but primarily in the former. They proved to be among the most
controversial issues of the 2000 NPT Review Conference,
which is reflected in the number of paragraphs related to these
issues that had to be deleted from the draft Final Document
before a consensus could be reached.
Underlying the debate on export controls was the
perception by some NAM states, most visibly Egypt, Iran and
Malaysia, that inclusion of a reference in the Final Document
to the Zangger Committee, but more particularly to the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), would have begun a process
of giving these bodies formal status. These states feared that
this would have negative consequences within the
non-proliferation regime and for the 2005 NPT Review
Conference and its PrepCom. This issue was seen to have
legal and political implications. The legal aspect related to the
interpretation by states parties of what actions were consistent
or inconsistent with the rights and obligations set out in the
Treaty. The political side focused on those countries that felt
subject to unfair discrimination from the NSG.
These issues crystallised in disagreements over making
direct references to the role of the NSG in the Final
Document.9 The G-10 wanted the Conference to recognise
the role of the Zangger Committee and existing national
export control mechanisms in the prevention of nuclear
proliferation.10 In conjunction with the EU, they
acknowledged that greater transparency regarding export
controls, called for in the 1995 Principles and Objectives, was
still needed, and that further efforts and dialogue were
required to this end.11 Egypt, Iran and others complained,
however, that as long as not all states could participate in the
decision-making process of the Zangger Committee and the
NSG, they could not feel confident that their concerns were
being taken into account. Iran, in particular, argued that
‘unilaterally enforced export controls’ generated by the NSG
guidelines, hampered developing countries’ access to nuclear
materials, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes
and argued in favour of multilateral negotiations on effective
transfer guidelines. Pending these negotiations, Iran argued
that the NSG should take practical steps to practice greater
transparency in its proceedings and decision-making
processes and should allow all interested states parties to take
part in its deliberations.
Disagreements over the transparency issue were still
unresolved at midday on the final Friday of the Conference.
Iran, Egypt and the G-10 refused to surrender their positions.
MC.II was therefore reconvened on Saturday afternoon after
the disagreements in relation to Iraq had been resolved (see
the ‘Negotiating history’ of 16c, below). At this meeting, Iran
suggested that the disputed paragraphs be deleted in order to
achieve consensus. Although the G-10 and the EU were
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unhappy at losing their language on the NSG, Zangger and
their efforts at transparency, they came under intense pressure
to agree so that a Final Document could be adopted.
Eventually, they submitted, on the understanding that, in the
absence of new language in 2000, the language in the 1995
Principles and Objectives would remain operative.
The issue of full-scope safeguards as a condition of
nuclear supply to non-NPT parties was also controversial.
During the Conference, China opposed a paragraph
reaffirming the 1995 Principles and Objectives decision to
require this.12 The omission of a paragraph from the Final
Document, which had been listed among the 1995 Principles
and Objectives, was considered by many to represent a
backward step for the non-proliferation regime. In addition,
in one of their working papers, the G-10 proposed that the
next Review Conference should consider interpreting the
demand for full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply as
meaning that recipients should also have accepted the
additional protocol. This was also omitted in the Final
Document, which thus contained no reference to this matter.
The key paragraphs that were finally deleted from the 12
May draft were numbers 24, 40, 41, 42, 61, 68, 70, and 72.13
15a. Technical Assistance
‘The Conference, recalling the obligations of all States parties under articles I, II, and III of the Treaty, calls
upon all States parties not to cooperate or give assistance in the nuclear or nuclear-related field to States not
party to the Treaty in a manner which assists them in manufacturing nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 34]
Interpretations
This is a reminder to states parties not to give assistance to
non-parties that could conceivably be of use in a
nuclear-weapons programme. Although they are not named,
this relates to the transfer of materials and technology to India,
Israel and Pakistan. Interpretations may differ over how
‘assistance’ and ‘nuclear-related field’ should be defined in
this context, as certain technology is neither nuclear, nor
obviously dual-use and yet may assist a state in developing
nuclear weapons. The question, therefore, is where to draw
the line between legitimate and illegitimate assistance. Some
states interpret this paragraph to mean that any nuclear
assistance to a suspect non-party is tantamount to the
provision of assistance to a nuclear weapons programme,
despite the fact that this interpretation conflicts with article
IV on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – states parties refrain from providing
any nuclear weapon-related assistance to non-parties.
• Positive steps – states parties review their cooperation and
assistance practices in an effort to ensure that they do not
assist the nuclear weapons programmes of non-parties.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states parties assist non-parties
with their nuclear weapons programmes.
• Other actions – third parties put pressure on states to
comply with this obligation and, if this does not help, take
appropriate punitive measures. The exporting state
requires, as a condition of supply, safeguards only on the
facility, or facilities, involved.
Political realities
A number of states parties to the NPT are alleged to have
ignored their Treaty obligations and supplied non-parties to
the Treaty with technologies and materials that could assist
in the development of their nuclear weapons programmes.
Two – and possibly three – non-parties to the Treaty are said
to have benefited from assistance from some NWS.  
Although such activities are denounced by the
international community, this appears to have limited effects.
Exports that may help nuclear programmes appear to be
continuing. A core problem in this context is how far the
definition of assistance should be stretched, and whether a
clear dividing line can be drawn between civil and military
activities.
The lifting of the sanctions imposed on India and
Pakistan by Canada, Japan and the US following their 1998
tests may well complicate matters further, and could be seen
in a negative light where non-proliferation is concerned.
These actions make it easier for such states to assist India and
Pakistan’s nuclear activities, and might also set a precedent
for other NNWS that seek to pursue a nuclear-weapons
programme. In doing so, it could seriously undermine the
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Recommendations
• States should not provide weapon-related assistance to
non-parties to the Treaty.
• Attempts should be made to clarify the degree to which
specific activities should be regarded as assistance to
nuclear-weapons programmes.
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15b.  Export Controls
‘The Conference recognizes that national rules and regulations of States parties are necessary to ensure
that the States parties are able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and
nuclear-related dual-use items to all States taking into account articles I, II, and III of the Treaty, and, for
States parties, also fully respecting article IV. In this context, the Conference urges States parties that have
not yet done so to establish and implement appropriate national rules and regulations.’
[Article III etc., paragraph 51]
Interpretations
This is an appeal for all states parties to operate national
export controls, and to do so in accordance with their NPT
commitments. However, there are differing interpretations of
what these commitments are, as it is difficult to draw a clear
line between the obligations contained in article I14 and those
found in article IV.15
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – states in a position to engage in
nuclear exports impose controls in a manner consistent
with their other NPT obligations. All states ensure that they
are not used as transit points, including those states that are
not in a position to export.
• Positive steps – specific states, particularly those that could
be used as transit points, introduce export controls.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – specific states abandon export
controls.
• Other actions – states assist other states in introducing
national export control legislation. States share informa-
tion on export requests that might be nuclear-weapon-
related and transit of potentially weapon-related items.
Political realities
At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, while the non-aligned
states were prepared to recognise that national export controls
are necessary to implement NPT commitments, they were not
prepared to recognise the right of states to work together to
draw up common guidelines for such controls if these resulted
in restrictive export policies. However, the need for effective
export controls has become more urgent because
developments in a range of areas have resulted in:
• the distinction between military and commercial products
becoming less clear;
• sophisticated sensitive technologies becoming more
readily available;
• many states regarding short-term economic benefits of
supply as outweighing longer-term security concerns;
• the pace of high technology business having increased
enormously and the information revolution and the
internationalisation of scientific knowledge having
accelerated the diffusion of advanced technologies; and
• barriers to the flow of goods, investment, labour and
services having diminished substantially in Europe, the
Americas and Asia.
Recommendations
• States should assist each other in introducing and
implementing national export control legislation.
• States should share information on suspect nuclear-
weapon-related export requests.
• Efforts to clarify the specific materials and facilities that
would be of assistance to nuclear weapons programmes
should continue.
15c.  Transparency
‘The Conference requests that any supplier arrangement should be transparent and should continue to take
appropriate measures to ensure that the export guidelines formulated by them do not hamper the
development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with articles I, II, III, and IV
of the Treaty.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 53]
Interpretations
This paragraph originates from a 1995 commitment to pro-
mote transparency in export control arrangements. Paragraph
17 of the Principles and Objectives stated that: ‘Transparency
in nuclear-related export controls should be promoted within
the framework of dialogue and cooperation among all
interested States party to the Treaty.’ This language has been
weakened in the Final Document, by changing the original
phrase ‘should be promoted’ to ‘requests that’. Moreover, it
is not clear who should take the ‘appropriate measures’ called
for in the proposal or what they should be or who the ‘them’
are – the NSG or individual states. It also mixes up the issue
of transparency with peaceful uses, making the question of
fulfilment difficult to assess. In the interests of clarity, only
the first part of the paragraph is dealt with here. Discussion
of the peaceful uses issue is included in the section above.
Levels of fulfilment
None are offered, for reasons discussed in ‘Political realities’.
Political realities
Underlying this paragraph are the conflicting positions of the
developing states and the NSG:
• From the perspective of the NSG, this request is being
fulfilled by the holding of international seminars on the
role of export controls in nuclear non-proliferation, of
which one was held in Vienna, in 1997, and another in
1999, in New York. These events are organised by the
NSG, and are designed specifically to contribute to
transparency, as called for in paragraph 17 of the Principles
and Objectives. (See deleted paragraph number 42 from
the draft of 12 May, footnote 13).
• From Iran’s perspective, and a number of other members
of the non-aligned, complete fulfilment of this proposal
would mean the participation of developing countries in
the NSG, or its abolition.
At present, both sides in the argument show few signs that
they are willing to compromise.
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Recommendations
• At least two international seminars should be held before
2005 on the functioning of the NSG.
• Bilateral consultations might be held with critics of NSG
activities, with a view to understanding their objections,
and taking them into account to the extent possible.
• The NSG web site could be upgraded to make it interactive,
thus allowing for electronic dialogues.
16.  Compliance
Negotiating history
Compliance was discussed primarily in SB.2 of MC.II, along
with regional issues, despite the fact that many would have
preferred the issue to be dealt with in relation to safeguards.
It should be noted that the rules of procedure for NPT Review
Conferences make any discussion of compliance difficult
because a state against which allegations of non-compliance
have been made retains the right to block any consensus
language on the issue. It should also be noted that the DPRK
was not present at the Review Conference, but Iraq was, and
this had a significant impact on how the Conference treated
the two cases.
Whether non-compliance is solely concerned with article
III and IAEA safeguards, or is also relevant to other articles
of the Treaty has been a long-standing subject of debate in
the NPT context. Many states, therefore, while wishing to
address article III non-compliance rigorously, may have been
constrained by concerns that this would generate an acrimo-
nious debate on these matters in the context of other articles.
Within this general context, the key issues addressed by
the Conference were how to handle allegations of
non-compliance and what measures should be taken against
non-compliant parties. In practice, the DPRK case generated
few difficulties for the reason cited above, but the opposite
was the case with Iraq. The problems it posed were how to
characterise Iraq’s status with regard to compliance with the
Treaty, and whether it was legitimate to discuss the
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions in the
context of an NPT Review Conference. Iraq wanted the
Conference to focus exclusively on the way it had
implemented its obligations under the NPT over the last five
years, and not on issues relating to WMD and the
implementation of UN resolutions. The IAEA, it argued, had
specifically reported that there was no evidence of diversion
of materials in Iraq’s nuclear facilities and, consequently,
there were no allegations of non-compliance to answer.
Accepting this line of argument, Russia and a number of Arab
states questioned whether Iraq could still be said to be
non-compliant if the IAEA had not reported it to be so since
1995. In addition, China argued that there was no evidence
of present non-compliance, and that the Iraqi file should be
closed. The US, on the other hand, was determined to discuss
Iraq’s failure to comply with Security Council resolution 687.
In response, Iraq accused the US of failing to comply with its
own NPT commitments, citing a US-Israeli agreement on
some aspects of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, dated 22
February 2000. But the US argued that Israel’s non-adherence
to the NPT was not relevant in the context of the discussion
of Iraq’s non-compliance and that the Conference could not
ignore Iraq’s continued non-compliance with Security
Council resolution 687.
These divergent positions gave rise to an acrimonious
dispute. Paragraph 9 of the 11 May draft (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.II/CRP.13/Rev.1)16 was deleted in an attempt to reach
agreement, but this still left negotiations deadlocked over
paragraph 10. However, following the diplomatic efforts of
various delegations and intervention from senior officials in
the US Administration, a consensus was eventually achieved.
The US agreed to a form of wording that Iraq was also
prepared to accept, noting the recent IAEA inspections and
recognising that since the ‘cessation of IAEA inspections in
Iraq on 16 December 1998,’ the IAEA ‘has not been in a
position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s compliance under
UN Security Council resolution 687.’ At the same time, the
Conference re-affirmed ‘the importance of Iraq’s full
continuous cooperation with IAEA and compliance with its
obligations.’ This left opaque whether the sentence referred
to the future alone, or both the past and the future. When the
Final Document was adopted, Iraq registered its formal
reservations, arguing that it had fully complied with the NPT.
16a.  The Security Council
‘The Conference emphasizes the importance of access to the Security Council and the General Assembly by
IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C. of the statute of IAEA and paragraph 19
of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and
ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any
violations notified to it by IAEA.’  [Article III etc., paragraph 9]
Interpretations
This paragraph makes it clear that the Director General may
brief the General Assembly on possible violations of an IAEA
safeguards agreement but only the UN Security Council can
take binding action on such a matter. However, what is meant
by ‘appropriate measures’ remains opaque.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – agreement among members of the
Security Council and General Assembly as to what
constitutes ‘appropriate measures.’ Appropriate action by
the Security Council against states parties found guilty of
violating their Treaty obligations.
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• Positive steps – discussion takes place in the Security
Council and General Assembly of what constitutes
‘appropriate measures.’
• No movement – no attempt is made to reach consensus
over what constitutes appropriate measures.
• Outright non-fulfilment – N/A.
• Other actions – time is set aside in NPT Review
Conferences to discuss measures that could be taken in
cases of non-compliance.
Political realities
The Security Council is the only body that can act on the
IAEA’s findings. Even if there is agreement in the IAEA over
the validity of an allegation, this does not mean that the issue
will be dealt with effectively by the Security Council, which
may disagree over what constitutes appropriate action. The
divisions that existed within the Security Council over how
to deal with Iraqi and DPRK non-compliance illustrates this
problem.
It is unclear how the non-proliferation review process
can strengthen non-compliance procedures. Although there
is support among many states for amending the consensus
rule to make it easier to take punitive measures against states
found guilty of non-compliance, some states are likely to
oppose such change. Any attempt to seriously address the
issue may therefore increase tensions amongst NPT parties,
and undermine the review process. The issue therefore
presents the international community with a ‘Catch 22’:
unless voting procedures are changed, the NPT may be
increasingly regarded as impotent, but the very act of tackling
such a thorny problem could threaten the consensus which
underpins the Treaty and the regime.
Recommendations
• Consideration should be given to permanent members of
the Security Council not exercising their veto in cases
involving non-compliance with a safeguards agreement.
As stated over 50 years ago in the Baruch Plan: ‘There must
be no veto to protect those who violate their solemn
agreements not to develop or use atomic energy for
destructive purposes.’ (Baruch Plan, 14 June 1946).
• Time might be set aside at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference to discuss the compliance issue.
16b.  The Non-proliferation Regime and Non-compliance
‘The Conference reaffirms that the IAEA is the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in
accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance with its safeguards
agreements with States parties undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of
the Treaty, with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or
other nuclear explosive devices. It is the conviction of the Conference that nothing should be done to
undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding
non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by States parties should direct such concerns,
along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and
decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.’
[Article III etc., paragraph 7]
Interpretations
This paragraph originated from an Iranian proposal in 1995,
which attempted to criticise the US for making its own
judgements on Iran’s nuclear activities, instead of presenting
its concerns and evidence to the IAEA. It confirms the
authority of the IAEA to verify compliance, and urges states
parties that suspect others of non-compliance to present
evidence of such activities to the IAEA. The paragraph
stresses that once allegations of non-compliance have been
independently verified by the IAEA, it is up to that body, and
not the states parties themselves, to ‘draw conclusions and
decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.’
The word ‘should’ is used twice in relation to these
obligations, rather than ‘are urged’ or ‘are recommended.’
This constitutes relatively strong language against the use of
unilateral economic, political or military actions.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all states present their evidence of
non-compliance to the IAEA.
• Positive steps – some states present their evidence of
non-compliance to the IAEA.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states take unilateral action
against states suspected of non-compliance and fail to
submit evidence to the IAEA.
• Other actions – states present their concerns and evidence
to the state concerned so that it can voluntarily submit to
an investigation by the IAEA or another body nominated
or convoked by the states concerned. States may also make
their allegations to the IAEA direct, to the Secretariat of
an NWFZ, or to that of another regional institution.
Political realities
Confidence in compliance mechanisms must be strong,
providing a high degree of assurance that any violation will
be dealt with firmly and effectively. This involves both
detecting cases of non-compliance and having mechanisms
to deal with them. In the latter context, there is no specific
body within the IAEA dedicated to discussing the validity of
allegations of non-compliance. The Statute gives no guidance
in this matter, and SAGSI is not equipped to deal with it.
Although IAEA safeguards appear to be the mechanism
through which NPT members deal with issues of
non-compliance, in practice, the Agency has until recently
been reluctant to deal with questions of weaponisation, as
against diversion or clandestine production of nuclear
materials. This is now changing with the introduction of the
integrated safeguards system.
Recommendation
• A subsidiary body might be created within the Board of
Governors. This body would be concerned with all issues
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of diversion and non-declared activities, and would
determine the validity of allegations. It would probably
have to work by consensus. Both the state making the
allegations and the accused state should be able to attend
and speak at its meetings, but should not be allowed to vote.
Its findings could be reported to the Board.
16c.  Iraq
‘Bearing in mind the importance of full compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Conference notes
the statement of 24 April 2000 by the IAEA Director General that, since the cessation of IAEA inspections in
Iraq on 16 December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq’s
compliance with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). The Conference further notes
that IAEA carried out an inspection in January 2000 pursuant to Iraq’s safeguards agreement with IAEA
during which the inspectors were able to verify the presence of nuclear material subject to safeguards (low
enriched, natural and depleted uranium). The Conference reaffirms the importance of Iraq’s full continuous
cooperation with IAEA and compliance with its obligations.’ [The Middle East, particularly implementation of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, paragraph 10]
Interpretations
This paragraph leaves unclear whether it refers to Iraq’s
obligations under the UN Security Council resolution 687 or
Iraq’s IAEA safeguards agreement. This ambiguity was
intentional, drafted to bridge the gap between the divergent
positions of Iraq and the US, as described in the negotiating
history.
Unlike the deleted paragraph 9 (see footnote 16), which
referred specifically to the two ‘regrettable’ cases of
non-compliance, this paragraph makes no direct reference to
instances of non-compliance. It states that the IAEA has not
been able to verify Iraq’s compliance with its obligations
under Security Council resolution 687, but it uses objective
language to report this problem. The last line of the paragraph,
which refers to ‘…the importance of Iraq’s full continuous
cooperation with IAEA and compliance with its obligations,’
represents a device to reach agreement between the opposing
positions of Iraq and the US. Iraq could interpret this last
sentence as meaning that it had complied with its NPT
obligations over the last five years, whereas the US could
interpret it as a call to Iraq to comply with all its obligations
in future.
Levels of fulfilment
Levels of fulfilment relating to UN Security Council
resolution 687 and the IAEA comprehensive safeguards
agreement pursuant to the NPT, are outlined below.
• Complete fulfilment – Iraq complies with its IAEA
obligations under Security Council resolution 687. Iraq
cooperates fully with the IAEA pursuant to that resolution,
and ratifies the additional protocol.
• Positive steps – Iraq complies with some of its IAEA
obligations under Security Council resolution 687, e.g. by
admitting inspectors into areas not necessarily covered by
IAEA comprehensive safeguards inspections.
• No movement – Iraq continues to cooperate with the IAEA
in terms of its safeguards agreement, but refuses to fulfil
its relevant obligations under Security Council resolution
687.
• Outright non-fulfilment – Iraq refuses to cooperate with
the Security Council in relation to its relevant obligations.
Iraq refuses to allow IAEA inspections, pursuant to its
safeguards agreement.
• Other actions – the international community finds a way
out of the deadlock, perhaps reviewing Security Council
resolution 687.
Political realities
Concern over Iraq’s activities remains, and is compounded
by Iraq’s refusal to allow the IAEA’s Iraq Action Team to
enter the country.  Although further annual inspections under
Iraq’s INFCIRC/153 agreement with the IAEA have taken
place, the long-term monitoring system for nuclear sites
under Security Council resolution 687, known as the Ongoing
Monitoring and Verification (OMV) system, has yet to be
implemented.
Differences remain within the Security Council on how
to react to Iraq’s non-compliance with Security Council reso-
lution 687. In these circumstances, the possibility of states
taking direct action cannot be ruled out. This is an example
of the situation referred to in the Epilogue (see page 4).
Recommendations
• States parties should make a major effort to restore UN
inspections in Iraq.
• An assessment of incentives that could be used to
encourage Iraq to fulfil its obligations under Security
Council resolution 687 should be undertaken.
• Steps should be actively pursued to persuade Iraq to accept
the additional protocol.
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16d.  The DPRK
‘The Conference looks forward to the fulfilment by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea of its stated
intention to come into full compliance with its Treaty safeguards agreement with IAEA, which remains binding
and in force. The Conference emphasizes the importance of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
preserving and making available to IAEA all information needed to verify its initial declaration.’
[Article III etc., paragraph 15]
Interpretations
This was a G-10 proposal from NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/
WP.3. The ‘Treaty safeguards agreement’ referred to here is
the standard safeguards agreement pursuant to the NPT. This
agreement remains binding and in force. When the IAEA first
started to implement it, it discovered evidence that the DPRK
had extracted more plutonium than it had declared. Since
then, the DPRK has removed the irradiated fuel from its
5-megawatt (MW) research reactor, without allowing the
Agency to obtain the information required to determine how
it had been operated and the amount of plutonium that should
have accumulated. These matters remain unresolved, hence
the call to preserve and make available all information.
The IAEA has not been able to apply its full safeguards
system in the DPRK. It has only been able, by resident
inspection, to verify that the nuclear fuel removed from the
5-MW reactor remains in storage and that the chemical
reprocessing facility is not operating.17 Under the terms of the
1994 Agreed Framework it is a precondition for the supply
of major components of the light-water reactors (LWRs) that
the DPRK should again return to full compliance with its
IAEA safeguards agreement.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the DPRK returns to full
compliance with the Agency’s safeguards agreement and
makes available the information needed to verify its initial
declaration.
• Positive steps – swift progress takes place under the
Agreed Framework.
• No movement – delays continue in implementing the
Agreed Framework.
• Outright non-fulfilment – the DPRK fails to make
available any additional information to assist the IAEA in
its verification objectives, and ceases to allow IAEA
inspections. The Agreed Framework collapses.
• Other actions – the 1992 ROK/DPRK Joint Nuclear
Control Commission is revived.18
Political realities
The IAEA is still unable to verify the correctness and
completeness of the DPRK’s initial declaration. In November
2000, the Agency explained in more detail its generic
requirements for the verification procedure, and was
permitted by the DPRK to identify some of the documents
that needed to be preserved for this purpose. However, the
DPRK remains in non-compliance with its safeguards
agreement and the Agency has been able to implement only
some of the required safeguards measures.
Limitations on the activities of the IAEA have been
compounded by delays in implementing the Agreed
Framework. The completion of the LWR project may only be
possible by 2008, despite the US’ original pledge of 2003.
This has led the DPRK to talk of scrapping the Framework
Agreement and abandoning its nuclear freeze.
Recommendations
• Work on the construction of LWRs should proceed as
rapidly as possible.
• Steps to promote good relations between the DPRK and
the ROK should be continued.
• Talks between the DPRK and the US should be resumed,
without the imposition of unreasonable preconditions by
either side.
• Neighbouring states, including the Republic of Korea,
China, and Russia, should urge the DPRK to allow the
IAEA to give full effect to the safeguards agreement
concluded pursuant to the NPT.
17.  Security Assurances & NWFZs
Negotiating history
The issue of negative security assurances (NSAs) was
discussed in MC.I, alongside nuclear disarmament. A
chairman’s working paper, containing paragraphs on these
issues, was first submitted on 4 May, and following revisions
on 9 May, was incorporated in the draft report of MC.I. This
was submitted to the plenary meeting on 11 May.
During discussions, the non-aligned and the NAC raised
concerns that the NWS were not taking their NSA commit-
ments seriously. As a result, Egypt renewed its demand that
NSAs be made legally binding. The NWS, with the exception
of China, responded by arguing that the NSAs had already
been significantly strengthened under the various protocols
of the NWFZs, and that no further action was needed. In
contrast to previous Conferences, the NATO-5 appeared to
publicly support the non-aligned’s position, and proposed
language to bridge the differences between the NWS and the
non-aligned. However, the issue did not command the
attention that many observers believed it would. No
recommendations for immediate action were made on this
issue and it was remitted for further discussion to the
PrepCom for the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
China argued for the inclusion in the Final Document of
NSAs by the NWS, and for the conclusion of an international
convention on this subject. In order to reach agreement,
however, these proposals were dropped.
NWFZs were discussed in MC.II. Many states referred
to the importance of this issue in their working papers and
statements, including Belarus, China, the EU, Mongolia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan.
Many delegations, including China and the US,
expressed their support for the establishment of a NWFZ in
Central Asia, which Japan noted would be the first in the
northern hemisphere. Five Central Asian countries submitted
a working paper asking the Conference to recognise and
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welcome the steps that they have taken towards a draft treaty
and expressing their firm commitment to conclude the
process.
A Belarus proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free ‘space’ in
Central and Eastern Europe, however, generated little
support. This issue remained unresolved until the end of
negotiations. Belarus wanted the Final Document to make a
specific reference to its proposal, but this was opposed by 15
countries from the region and the EU. Belarus refused to
compromise until the last minute, when it settled for a
paragraph based on UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC)
language, which noted and welcomed all initiatives to
promote new NWFZs.
The importance of signing and ratifying the existing
NWFZ treaties was stressed, including the protocols relevant
to the NWS.
17a.  Security Assurances & the NWS
‘…The Conference agrees that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to the
non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Conference calls on the Preparatory Committee to
make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.’
[Article VII etc., paragraph 2]
Interpretations
This paragraph represented a compromise between the
positions of the non-aligned and the NWS on the issue of
legally binding NSAs, and originated from a NATO-5
proposal to bridge the gap between the two positions. The
non-aligned wanted NSAs not only in the current context of
NWFZs and Security Council resolutions, but also through a
legally binding convention. This would also offer
commitments to NNWS that were not parties to a NWFZ.
With the exception of China, the NWS resisted this initiative.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the PrepCom makes
recommendations on the issue of legaly binding security
assurances to the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
• Positive steps – no recommendations on this issue are
made, but discussions take place within the PrepCom on a
legally binding document on NSAs.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – this issue is not discussed at the
PrepCom.
• Other actions – additional NWFZs are created.
Political realities
The subject of NSAs has long been a cause of controversy
between the non-aligned and a number of NWS. It figured
prominently in the run-up to the 2000 Review Conference and
became even more important in the eyes of many states party
to the NPT who believed that some of the NWS were
wavering in their commitments on assurances. A number of
US and NATO proclamations regarding nuclear doctrine
appeared to undermine the long-standing commitments that
the NWS reaffirmed in 1995 – i.e,. that nuclear weapons
would not be used (or threatened to be used in the case of the
NWFZ Treaties) against NPT NNWS. For example, when
signing protocol I to the Pelindaba Treaty, President Clinton
preserved the US option to retaliate with nuclear weapons
against an attack involving chemical or biological weapons.19
This position was reaffirmed by US Defence Secretary Cohen
the following year, when he rejected a German proposal that
NATO adopt a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons in
future conflicts. In the case of NATO, its NWS parties
(France, the UK and the US) retain the option to use nuclear
weapons first in future conflicts as part of NATO’s deterrence
posture. In its new military doctrine, NATO has also
reaffirmed its right to use nuclear weapons in retaliation
against a chemical or biological attack. This posture conflicts
with the NWS’ commitments to the NNWS, as reaffirmed in
1995.
The incentives for the NWS to strengthen their NSAs
may have diminished significantly following the terrorist
attacks on the US and associated fears of WMD use.  Some
have argued that a failure to strengthen these pledges could
have long-term negative consequences and weaken the NPT
regime.
Recommendations
• Possible draft treaties on security assurances should be
discussed in the PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review
Conference (two such drafts already exist, drawn up by
Myanmar in 1998 [NPT/CONF.2000/PC.II/18] and South
Africa in 2000 [NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/9]).
• Discussions should be restarted amongst the NWS over the
possibility of agreeing universal security assurances.
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17b.  Existing NWFZs
‘The Conference stresses the importance of signature and ratification of the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga,
Bangkok and Pelindaba by all regional States, as well as the signature and ratification by the nuclear-
weapon States that have not yet done so of the relevant protocols to those treaties, recognizing that security
assurances are available to States parties to those treaties. In this context, the Conference also takes note of
the statement of the five nuclear-weapon States that the internal processes are under way to secure the few
lacking ratifications to the treaties of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, and that consultations with the Parties to the
Treaty of Bangkok have been accelerated, paving the way for adherence by the five nuclear-weapon States
to the protocol to that Treaty.’ [Article VII etc., paragraph 11]
Interpretations
This is an unambiguous call to the states in the regions
concerned to sign and ratify the relevant NWFZ treaties and
to the NWS to sign and ratify the protocols to them.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – signature and ratification of the
Treaty of Tlatelolco by Cuba. Signature and ratification of
the treaties of Bangkok and Pelindaba by all states in the
respective regions that have not yet done so. Signature and
ratification of the protocol to the Treaty of Pelindaba by
Spain, and ratification of it by Russia and the US.
Ratification of the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga by
the US. Accelerated negotiations to facilitate signature and
ratification of the protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok by the
NWS.
• Positive steps – some of the ratifications listed above take
place, and progress is made towards reaching agreement
over the Treaty of Bangkok.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – no steps are taken towards
ratification of additional NWFZ treaties. Negotiations over
the protocol to the Treaty of Bangkok stall. States walk
out/abrogate any one of the NWFZ treaties.
• Other actions – the Treaty of Bangkok is amended to
facilitate acceptance of the protocol by the NWS.
Political realities
The Treaty of Tlatelolco has been signed and ratified by all
states within the zone, with the exception of Cuba, which has
stated that it will only agree to sign if the US withdraws from
its military base at Guantanamo Bay.
The Treaty of Pelindaba requires 28 states to deposit their
instruments of ratification before it can enter into force. So
far 50 have signed, but only 11 states have ratified. With
regard to the protocols, all the NWS have signed, but Russia
and the US have yet to ratify. Spain has yet to sign or ratify
protocol III. The Arab signatories to the Treaty are said to
believe that, if they ratified it, their negotiating position with
Israel over the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East would
be jeopardised.
The Treaty of Rarotonga entered into force on 11
December 1986. The relevant protocols have been signed by
all the NWS, and ratified by all except the US, which controls
territory within the zone (Jarvis Island and American Samoa).
The Treaty of Bangkok entered into force on 15
December 1995. None of the NWS have signed the Treaty’s
only protocol, which calls on them not to use, or threaten to
use, nuclear weapons in the zone. China has resolved all its
outstanding issues on the Treaty and the protocol with
Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and has
agreed to sign the protocol as soon as the other NWS do so.
However, the other NWS disagree with the Treaty’s
provisions on the transit of foreign ships and aircraft, and on
defining its boundaries using exclusive economic zones and
continental shelves. At the 1997 PrepCom the NWS
announced their interest in adopting the protocol, but since
then little progress has been made. One of the major sticking
points is the US’ contention that it was not adequately
consulted during negotiations, and that the protocol goes
beyond the universal NSAs that the US gave in 1995. France,
Russia and the UK are demanding clarification of how the
Treaty would be implemented, as it requires the NWS to give
security assurances in respect of a large sea area, not just the
territories in the region. This would have major strategic
implications. A further objection is that the protocol gives
NSAs to countries within the zone, whether or not they are
(still) parties to it. Although Indonesia, which asserts control
over three sea-lanes within the zone, is willing to modify the
protocol in order to make it acceptable to all the NWS,
Malaysia is opposed to a modification. The situation is further
complicated by the Philippines, which has ratified the Treaty,
but is accused of breaking its Treaty obligations by signing
an agreement with the US, which, critics charge, does not bar
entry of US nuclear weapons to its territory.
Recommendations
• Cuba and the US should create the conditions that would
make it possible for Cuba to ratify the Treaty of
Tlatelolco.  States parties, particularly Russia, should
encourage Cuba to do so.
• All signatories should ratify the Treaty of Pelindaba as
soon as possible so it can enter into force and Spain should
sign and ratify protocol III.
• The US should be encouraged to ratify the Treaty of
Rarotonga.
• The states concerned should accelerate negotiations over
possible changes to the text of the Treaty of Bangkok and
its protocol, or agree on interpretations, with a view to
resolving outstanding issues as soon as possible.
33
17c.  A NWFZ in the Middle East
‘The Conference welcomes the consensus reached in the General Assembly since the thirty-fifth session,
that its establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international
peace and security. The Conference urges all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the
practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free
zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,
and as a means of promoting this objective, invites the countries concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and pending the establishment of the zone, to agree to place all their
nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.’ [Article VII etc., paragraph 12]
Interpretations
This is an unambiguous endorsement of the long-standing
goal of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East (MENWFZ).
While there are different interpretations among the states of
the region as to what constitutes ‘practical and urgent steps,’
for now, two benchmarks are clearly outlined for states in the
region to achieve: adherence to the NPT, and the placement
of all nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – NPT parties in the region take steps
to place all nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards with
a view to creating a MENWFZ.
• Positive steps – NPT parties in the region take steps to
place additional nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – no steps are taken to work
towards the establishment of a MENWFZ.
• Other actions – the creation of a zone free of all WMD, not
just nuclear weapons.
Political realities
Since 1980, the UNGA has supported annual resolutions
calling for the creation of a MENWFZ. All states in the region
have supported this consensus, including Israel. However,
although Israel has always argued in favour of a MENWFZ,
it refuses to put its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards
first. Nine Arab states parties to the NPT have yet to conclude
the appropriate safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
Many obstacles must be overcome before a NWFZ can
be created in the Middle East. To be effective, the zone would
have to include the 22 member states of the Arab League, as
well as Iran and Israel, and stretch from Algeria in North
Africa to Iran in the Persian Gulf.20 This is a particularly
daunting challenge because a) it involves the difficult and
interrelated tasks of rolling back existing nuclear-weapons
programmes, and freezing the non-nuclear status of other
regional actors, and b) it involves a region plagued by a long
history of intense political conflicts which remain unresolved.
Without peace in the region and settlement of the problems
between Israel and Palestine, there is no chance for universal
adherence to the NPT or a MENWFZ.
Recommendations
• States in the region should support efforts by Israel and the
Palestinian Authority to reach a peaceful settlement.
• There should be further discussion of relevant issues, such
as the boundaries of the MENWFZ.
• The respective preconditions for the creation of the zone
should be identified.
• Possible forums should be selected for discussions of a
MENWFZ.
• The UN General Assembly could call for another UN
expert study on the possibilities of the creation of an
MENWFZ.
17d.  A NWFZ in Central Asia
‘The Conference regards the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones as a matter of priority,
and in this respect supports the intention and commitment of the five Central Asian States to establish a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region, welcomes the practical steps they have taken towards
implementation of their initiative and notes with satisfaction the substantial progress they have made in
drawing up and agreeing on a draft treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central
Asia.’ [Article VII etc., paragraph 14]
Interpretations
This paragraph articulates the Conference’s unreserved
support for a NWFZ in Central Asia.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – conclusion and entry into force of
the Central Asian NWFZ treaty or its provisional
application by those states that have already ratified.
• Positive steps – further moves to establish a NWFZ in
Central Asia.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – negotiations on this issue
collapse.
• Other actions – NWS indicate their preparedness in
principle to subscribe to the NSA protocol.
Political realities
In the past, there has been broad support for the establishment
of a Central Asian NWFZ. Each year, except 2001, the
UNGA has passed a resolution in favour of the zone. In 2001
there was no resolution because Turkmenistan refused to be
a cosponsor.  It is unclear how the recent intensification of
military conflict in the region will affect progress towards the
completion of the zone. It may increase Russian determin-
ation to retain maximum flexibility regarding nuclear-wea-
pon deployments; or it may increase the perceived urgency
on the part of the Central Asian states to establish the NWFZ.
Recommendations
• All countries concerned should participate in the Expert
Group deliberations.
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• The Secretary General should be encouraged to use his
good offices to facilitate the conclusion of negotiations.
• The NWS should indicate their preparedness in principle
to subscribe to the NSA protocol.
• The 2002 PrepCom could recommend that the 2005 NPT
Review Conference set a deadline for the completion of
negotiations.
17e.  Additional NWFZs
‘The Conference, taking note of all initiatives by States parties, believes that the international Community
should continue to promote the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with the
relevant guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and in that spirit welcomes the efforts
and proposals that have been advanced by the States parties since 1995 in various regions of the world.’
[Article VII etc., paragraph 15]
Interpretations
This paragraph acted as a safety net in order to enable Belarus
to claim that its proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free space in
Central and Eastern Europe had been considered by the
Conference. It represents an endorsement of all efforts to
create NWFZs as a positive step towards regional security
and the eventual goal of a NWFW. This includes the Belarus
proposal, and Mongolia’s efforts to become a
nuclear-weapon-free space, the MENWFZ and the proposals
that have been made for NWFZs in South, Central, and
North-East Asia.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the establishment of new NWFZs
in Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia, and
North-East Asia, based on arrangements freely arrived at
by the states in the regions concerned.
• Positive steps – NPT parties show greater willingness to
engage in constructive negotiations on new NWFZs.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – NPT parties refuse to engage in
negotiations over the creation of new NWFZs, and
undermine new proposals.
• Other actions – negotiations take place over WMD-free
zones, to include nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons.
Political realities
A NWFZ in Central and Eastern Europe might include the
three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), the four
Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and
Hungary), three ex-Soviet Republics (Belarus, Moldova, and
Ukraine), Romania and Bulgaria. This would create a zone
across Europe stretching from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea.
The problems with this particular proposal centre on NATO
and its enlargement. Most of the countries that would make
up the zone have either joined NATO as part of the
enlargement plans agreed in 1997 (the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Hungary), or have expressed a desire to join
NATO.  NATO itself is opposed to the creation of a NWFZ
in Central and Eastern Europe. Although it has stated that it
has ‘no plans, no intentions, and no reasons’ to deploy nuclear
weapons on these territories, it is unwilling to accept a
binding international commitment.
Proposals for NWFZs in South and North-East Asia also
face serious obstacles. With regard to a NWFZ in North-East
Asia (NEANWFZ), China and the US have stated their
opposition to the proposed zone, Japan and the ROK appear
to have serious reservations about it, and the position of the
DPRK is unclear. With regard to the establishment of a
NWFZ in South Asia (SANWFZ), India and Pakistan have
both argued that such a zone cannot be created without first
improving the general context of their bilateral relations,
including settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Finally, Mongolia appears to have politically recognised,
but not legally binding, nuclear-weapon-free status (NWFS).
The NWS regard this as a purely domestic matter.   Many
outstanding legal and practical issues remain if Mongolia’s is
to acquire its desired legal status.
Recommendations
• NATO should, as soon as possible, permit any member
state that wishes to do so to become part of a NWFZ.
• The international community should continue to promote
the establishment of a NEANWFZ and a SANWFZ.
• There should be further discussions on whether current
commitments on Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free status
are legally binding.
18.  Physical Protection Issues
Negotiating history
There can be little doubt that, had the 2000 NPT Review
Conference been held after the terrorist attacks of September
11, it would have devoted more attention in its deliberations
to the issues of physical protection of nuclear materials and
nuclear terrorism. What little discussion there was of the latter
took place in MC.II, where a paragraph in the draft report on
the Draft Convention on Nuclear Terrorism was deleted late
in the proceedings due to a lack of consensus.21  Similarly, in
MC.III, physical security was of limited significance in its
debates compared with issues such as the right to access to
peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic development,
the utility of nuclear power, and the dangers of the maritime
transportation of radioactive materials and waste.  As a
consequence, while the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material played a role in the discussions
on maritime transport, the issue of the security of nuclear
material in national facilities received much less attention.
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Linked to the issue of terrorist use of nuclear materials is
the possibility of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities. Since
September 11, there have been mounting concerns over the
potential for terrorist attacks on power reactors, fuel and
waste storage sites, and reprocessing plants. There are reports
that the aircraft which crashed in Pennsylvania on September
11 might have been meant to destroy the Three Mile Island
nuclear power plant in that state. The 2000 NPT Review
Conference addressed this issue indirectly but, given the level
of international concern that has arisen since September 11,
it seems probable that these issues will be the focus of
considerable attention during the 2005 NPT Review
Conference process, as well as in other international forums.
This section therefore addresses the paragraphs of the Final
Document related to such developments.
18a.  The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material
‘The Conference urges all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material on the earliest possible date and to apply, as appropriate, the
recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and facilities contained in IAEA document
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) and in other relevant guidelines. It welcomes the ongoing informal
discussions among legal and technical experts, under the aegis of IAEA, to discuss whether there is a need
to revise the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 56]
Interpretations
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material applies to nuclear material used for peaceful
purposes while in international transport.  It therefore does
not apply to such nuclear material in other circumstances, or
to nuclear material committed to military purposes. Although
extensions to its scope into these areas have been proposed,
little progress has been made since 1980, due to arguments
over the cost of implementing physical protection measures,
the need and priority to be assigned to negotiating such
extensions, and concerns that international oversight of such
matters would infringe national sovereignty and security.
This provision recommends that discussions over amending
the Convention continue, and in the meantime, urges states
to implement the guidelines set out in INFCIRC/225, which
are broader in scope than those set out in the Convention.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all states that have not yet done so
become parties to the Convention on the Physical
Protection of Nuclear Material.22  All states apply the
recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear
material and facilities contained in IAEA document
INFCIRC/225/Rev.4.
• Positive steps – some additional states become party to the
Convention. Some states apply the recommendations
contained in INFCIRC/225.
• No movement – none of the current non-parties become
party to the Convention. No additional states apply the
recommendations contained in INFIRC/225.
• Outright non-fulfilment – contracting parties do not
comply with their obligations under the Convention or
withdraw from it altogether. Non-signatories state that
they have no intention of becoming party to this
Convention. States do not apply the recommendations
contained in INFCIRC/225.
• Other actions – the Convention on the Physical Protection
of Nuclear Material is amended. A Convention on Nuclear
Terrorism is adopted.
Political realities
Several different options have been advanced to strengthen
physical protection measures, although no international
consensus exists over which should be pursued. Although the
Draft Convention on Nuclear Terrorism covers the use and
storage of nuclear material as well as its transport, and
includes non-safeguarded material, it falls short of the
standards set out in INFCIRC/225, and contains no measures
to monitor compliance. Some states argue, therefore, that the
Draft Convention does not go far enough, while others argue
over how the term ‘terrorism’ should be defined. Opinion is
also divided over whether and how to amend the Convention
on Physical Protection. The US has called for a Review
Conference to discuss the issue of extending its scope to
incorporate nuclear material in domestic peaceful use,
transport, and storage23. Some international support for this
proposal has been forthcoming, but other states have argued
that any amendments should also cover nuclear material
intended for military uses. Still others argued that they could
not afford to implement the standards set by the current
Convention, and that the cost of implementing an amended
Convention would be prohibitive.
States may now be more willing to reach a compromise
on these issues following the events of September 11.
Heightened fears over the theft of nuclear materials, and the
possible sabotage of nuclear materials and facilities by
non-state actors, has led to pressure for action, and has
resulted in such threats gaining prominence in international
forums. For example, a special session of the IAEA Board of
Governors met on 30 November 2001 to examine ways to
prevent nuclear terrorism.24 In its subsequent report,
Protection Against Nuclear Terrorism, the IAEA Secretariat
outlined the financial and political commitment that states
will have to make to ensure that the Agency’s existing nuclear
security guidelines are strengthened, expanded and
implemented. According to the report, the estimated cost will
be $30–50 million per year.
Alongside this new sense of urgency, there is also
mounting concern that transparent physical protection
methods may unintentionally assist the operations of terrorist
groups, by making relevant information available to them.
Recommendations
• Efforts should be made to raise awareness amongst
governments and private entities involved in the transport,
storage and use of radioactive material of:
— newly heightened terrorist threats;
— the need to set a common high standard of physical
protection; and
— the need to promote international cooperation for this
purpose, by acts such as helping states that cannot
afford the cost of providing enhanced protection, and
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through the exchange of information on appropriate
measures of protection, cooperation among security
authorities, and the coordination of activities to
regulate the safety and security of nuclear materials in
transit.
• The implications of the physical protection issue should be
discussed at the PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review
Conference.
• Issues of physical protection should continue to be
addressed by the IAEA, including the utility of a protocol
expanding the scope of the existing Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
• States should be encouraged to make voluntary financial
contributions to the IAEA’s nuclear security programme.
• States with nuclear facilities that are particularly
vulnerable to nuclear terrorism, but which lack the
necessary funds to implement urgent security measures,
should be given appropriate assistance if they so request.
• All non-parties, who have not yet done so, should sign the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material.
• States should explore ways of moving forward the Draft
Convention on Nuclear Terrorism.
• The NWS should maintain and upgrade the physical
protection of nuclear materials committed to military use
even though the Convention is not applicable to such
materials.
18b.  Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste
‘The Conference notes that a major issue in the debate over the use of nuclear technologies is the safety of
the management of spent fuel and of radioactive waste. The Conference notes the conclusion of the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
and encourages States that have not yet taken the necessary steps to become party to the Convention, to do
so. The Conference expresses the hope that this Convention will enter into force at the earliest possible
date. The Conference underlines the importance of managing fuel and radioactive waste that were excluded
from this Convention because they were within military or defence programmes in accordance with the
objectives stated in this Convention.’ [Spent fuel and radioactive waste, paragraph 13]
Interpretations
This is a request for all states to become party to the Joint
Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint
Convention) and for the Convention to enter into force as
soon as possible. The last sentence underlines the need for
similar standards to be applied to spent fuel and radioactive
waste generated by military programmes. Such materials are
only covered by the Joint Convention when they are
transferred permanently to, and managed within, exclusively
civilian programmes. The Conference therefore urges states
to apply voluntarily the safety measures set out in the Joint
Convention to spent fuel and radioactive waste from their
military programmes.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all states that have not yet done so
become party to the Joint Convention on the Safety of
Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management. States apply the safety standards
contained in the Joint Convention to spent fuel and
radioactive waste from their military programmes.
• Positive steps – some states take the steps described above.
• No movement – no additional states become party to the
Joint Convention.
• Outright non-fulfilment – contracting parties do not
comply with their obligations under the Joint Convention
or withdraw from it.
• Other actions – states implement more stringent safety
standards for spent fuel storage and waste disposal than
those prescribed in the Joint Convention.
Political realities
The Joint Convention was the first legal instrument to directly
address the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste on a
global scale.25  However, although its entry into force on 18
June 2001 is regarded as a major contribution to the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, the September 11 terrorist attacks
and subsequent fears over nuclear terrorism have led some
experts to question whether its provisions are stringent
enough.26 This is based on new threat assessments, focusing
on the capabilities of non-state actors and the types of
weapons that they might realistically deploy. According to
some analysts, terrorists may be more likely to target
radioactive waste and spent fuel dumps because, unlike
reactors, they may be considered soft targets. This
particularly applies to those above-ground structures and
cooling pools, which were not built to withstand the same
explosive forces as reactor containment vessels.27
Recommendations
• States that have not yet become party to the Joint
Convention should take steps to do so.
• Contracting parties should comply with their obligations
under the Joint Convention.
• States should apply the safety obligations contained in the
Joint Convention to spent fuel and radioactive waste
excluded from the Convention.
• The Joint Convention should be reviewed in the light of
the revised threat assessments arising from the events of
September 11.28
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18c.  The Convention on Nuclear Safety
‘The Conference welcomes the entry into force of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and encourages all
States, in particular those operating, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors that have not yet taken
the necessary steps to become party to the Convention, to do so. It would also welcome a voluntary
application of the related provisions of the Convention to other relevant nuclear installations dedicated to the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference also expresses its satisfaction with the outcome of the first
review meeting under the Convention on Nuclear Safety, and looks forward to the report from the next review
meeting, in particular with respect to those areas where the first review meeting found that there was room
for safety improvements.’ [Nuclear and radiation safety, paragraph 4]
Interpretations
This Convention focuses on nuclear power reactors and
associated installations on the same site.  The paragraph
encourages all states, especially those operating, constructing
or planning nuclear power reactors, to become party to the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, thus covering some of the
gaps in relation to terrorist threats contained in other conven-
tions.29  It also requests that contracting parties voluntarily
apply the relevant provisions to ‘related’ nuclear installations
not covered by the Convention, such as research reactors and
civil reprocessing and enrichment plants. This is significant
as, under the terms of the Convention, a nuclear installation
is defined as ‘any land-based civil nuclear power plant under
its jurisdiction including such storage, handling and treatment
facilities for radioactive materials as are on the same site and
are directly related to the operation of the nuclear power
plant’ (emphasis added). According to this definition, a
power reactor ceases to be a nuclear installation when ‘all
nuclear fuel elements have been removed permanently from
the reactor core’. The Convention also excludes radioactive
material being stored or processed at a different site.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the appropriate states sign and ratify
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. All contracting parties
voluntarily apply the provisions of the Convention to
nuclear installations not covered by the Convention.
• Positive steps – some of the appropriate states sign/ratify
the Convention or state their intention to do so in the near
future. Some contracting parties voluntarily apply the
provisions of the Convention to civil nuclear installations
not covered by the Convention.
• No movement – no new signatures or ratifications take
place. No additional voluntary applications are made.
• Outright non-fulfilment – contracting parties fail to imple-
ment their nuclear safety obligations or withdraw from the
Convention. Non-parties refuse to sign or ratify it.
• Other actions – India and/or Israel ratify the Convention.
Contracting parties voluntarily apply its safety measures
to military installations.
Political realities
The Convention on Nuclear Safety was adopted in Vienna on
17 June 1994, and entered into force on 24 October 1996. It
is designed to ensure fulfilment on the basis of the common
interest of the parties to achieve higher levels of safety, rather
than through inspections and sanctions.30 As a result, it relies
on the willingness of parties to the Convention to provide
honest, accurate self-assessments of their nuclear safety
record.
The first review meeting took place on 12–23 April 1999
in Vienna, and provided a unique worldwide overview of 45
national nuclear safety programmes. The summary report
noted that, while the available information suggested that
there have been significant safety improvements, the quality
of submissions varied significantly, and the following points
required urgent attention:
— a number of states have still to implement significant
safety improvements;
— nuclear safety activities in many contracting parties are
hampered by severe financial constraints;
— the technology imported by some states to assist their
nuclear safety programmes may be incompatible with
existing systems;
— a number of nuclear power plants, designed to earlier
safety standards and incapable of upgrading to new
standards, should be shut down as soon as practically
possible, taking into account the energy context as well
as the social, environmental and economic impact;
— there are serious safety issues in several countries
linked to the stagnation or shrinking of their nuclear
programmes;
— in some cases, the containments at existing nuclear
power plants do not meet current standards; and
— the independence of some regulatory bodies is in doubt.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety was drafted in the
aftermath of, and in response to, the Chernobyl accident. This
instrument was created to deal with the radiological risks
generated by the nuclear facility itself, as distinct from
external threats.
Recommendations
• All states with nuclear installations should sign the
Convention and implement the recommended safety
measures.
• All states should, as appropriate, voluntarily apply the
safety measures to nuclear installations not covered by the
Convention.
• When the Review Meeting scheduled for 2002 addresses
the issue of nuclear safety, it could also discuss the threat
and consequences of terrorist attacks.
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18d.  The Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials
‘Expressing concern about the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials, the Conference
urges all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the
security of such material. The Conference welcomes the activities in the fields of prevention, detection and
response being undertaken by IAEA in support of efforts against illicit trafficking. The Conference
acknowledges the Agency’s efforts to assist member States in strengthening the regulatory control in the
applications of radioactive materials, including its ongoing work on a registry of sealed sources. It also
welcomes the Agency’s activities undertaken to provide for the enhanced exchange of information among its
member States, including the continued maintenance of the illicit trafficking database. The Conference
recognizes the importance of enhancing cooperation and coordination among States and among
international organizations in preventing, detecting, and responding to the illegal use of nuclear and other
radioactive material.’ [Article III etc., paragraph 43]
Interpretations
This paragraph describes some of the activities that the IAEA
has been engaged in to help prevent the illicit trafficking of
nuclear materials, and welcomes the continuation of such
efforts. It also stresses the point that governments and
international organisations have an important role to play in
the prevention and detection of nuclear smuggling, and that
their contributions will be dependent on effective cooperation
between diverse groups. However, there is no mention of
what particular kinds of cooperation would be most desirable.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all states introduce and enforce
appropriate internal measures to protect nuclear material
and to combat nuclear smuggling.
• Positive steps – some states introduce and enforce
appropriate measures to protect nuclear material and to
combat nuclear smuggling.
• No movement – states fail to take additional steps to ensure
the above.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states do not introduce and
enforce appropriate measures to ensure the above, or
deliberately sabotage such efforts.
• Other actions – existing conventions are amended to
include more stringent measures to prevent smuggling. A
separate convention to prevent the illicit trafficking of
relevant materials is discussed.
Political realities
Despite the specific recommendations set out in the
Convention on Physical Protection, the Joint Convention, and
the Convention on Nuclear Safety, there have been 13
confirmed cases of nuclear smuggling since 1991, and many
more unconfirmed incidents. Concerns over this situation
have intensified since the events of September 11, with
reports in the media concerning the acquisition of nuclear and
radioactive materials by terrorists capable of producing ‘dirty
bombs’ (i.e., radiological weapons) and rudimentary nuclear
devices.31  The question of how to prevent the illicit
trafficking of nuclear materials has thus become very topical.
The subject is quite complicated and deals with a range
of issues, from the materials involved and the facilities where
they originate to the individuals or groups that might acquire
them. The issue calls for cooperation among the many
authorities involved within a state, as well as between states
and/or international organisations.
Recommendations
• States should introduce and enforce appropriate measures
and legislation to protect fissile material.
• States should allocate resources sufficient to safeguard
nuclear and other radioactive material.
• States should share intelligence information regarding
illicit nuclear trafficking incidents. When considering such
possibilities, they should take into account the need to
prevent such information from being misused.
• There should be enhanced cooperation between the IAEA,
governments, and organisations such as Interpol, to
prevent the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other
radioactive materials.
• The IAEA should reinforce all its activities related to the
prevention of illicit trafficking, for instance, by estab-
lishing electronic communication means with national and
international bodies involved in the collection of
information on clandestine trafficking in nuclear materials.
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Part III: Universality and the NPT
This part of the study follows a similar structure and approach
to Part I, except that the discussion of ‘Levels of fulfilment’
is omitted from sections that deal exclusively with non-
parties to the Treaty.  The latter are under no obligation to act
upon proposals made by NPT parties, although this by no
means lessens the desirability that they should do so.
During the Conference, universality was discussed in
Main Committee I (MC.I) and Main Committee II  (MC.II),
and also, in the context of regional matters, in Subsidiary
Body 2 (SB.2) of MC.II. Inevitably, therefore, there is a
certain amount of repetition on the subject of universality in
these three different elements of the Final Document.  MC.I
and MC.II took similar approaches to the universality issue,
addressing it in the wider context of the Treaty and the
non-proliferation regime (i.e. articles I, II and IX and the first
and third preambular paragraphs) and in the context of article
VII. This resulted in both Committees adopting very similar
language.
SB.2 of MC.II took a somewhat different approach. Its
proposals are to be found in the section of the Final Document
entitled: The Middle East, particularly implementation of the
1995 Resolution on the Middle East, and South Asia and other
regional issues.
19.  The Resolution on the Middle East
‘The Conference reaffirms the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review
and Extension Conference and recognises that the resolution remains valid until the goals and objectives are
achieved. The Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the depository States….is an essential element of the
outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995.’ [The Middle East, particularly implementation of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, paragraph 1]
Negotiating history
This paragraph in the Final Document was not so much about
the substance of the resolution and its fulfilment, as about the
question of whether the 1995 resolution was still operative in
2000 and beyond.32  After the resolution on the Middle East
had been adopted in 1995, differences arose between the US
and the Arab states, led by Egypt, over its future validity and
relevance. Egypt kept up the diplomatic pressure for its
fulfilment, particularly Israel’s accession to the Treaty and
placement of all its nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope
safeguards. It used the PrepCom as a forum for voicing its
concerns over the lack of progress towards fulfilment of the
1995 resolution, and urged that a subsidiary body be created
to address the issue in depth at the 2000 NPT Review
Conference,33 and give this issue a status distinct from the
other issues before the Conference.
A precondition for the 2000 NPT Review Conference
achieving a consensus on the Final Document was the success
of the President in obtaining agreement on a balanced
mandate for SB.2. This permitted the debate on the Middle
East to cover the implementation of the 1995 Middle East
resolution, and Israel’s non-adherence to the NPT, in which
context Egypt and the group of Arab states were determined
to name Israel as the only state in the region not to have
acceded to the Treaty, as well as meeting US insistence that
Iraqi non-compliance with UN resolutions on the destruction
of its WMD arsenal should be addressed in parallel.34  The
US also argued that the problems of the Middle East exceeded
the capacity of the NPT and should therefore be dealt with in
alternative international forums.
Interpretations
The language on this issue, which was only agreed to at the
end of the Conference, represented a compromise between
the positions of the Arab states and the US. Although it does
not explicitly urge states in the region to take the steps
outlined in the 1995 resolution, it does emphasise the
continued validity and relevance of its goals and objectives.
The Conference’s reaffirmation of the resolution thus carries
the issue of its implementation into future Review
Conferences.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – states parties take steps to achieve
all the goals and objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the
Middle East.
• Positive steps – states parties state their intention to resolve
the outstanding issues of the resolution.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – states parties take steps that
undermine the 1995 resolution or the prospects for
achieving its goals.
• Other actions – a subsidiary body is set up to discuss the
implementation of the resolution at the 2005 NPT Review
Conference, and special time is allocated for discussion of
the issue at the PrepCom. The UNGA calls for another UN
expert study on the possibilities of the creation of a
MENWFZ.
Political realities
Israeli officials have long argued that, given the country’s
strategic position, they cannot renounce the option to make
nuclear weapons through accession to the NPT or any other
means. This is in direct opposition to the views held by the
other states in the region that nuclear disarmament is an
essential goal in its own right and that comprehensive peace
and security cannot be achieved until Israel renounces its
nuclear option and accedes to the Treaty. These dichotomies
are reflected in the 1995 resolution, which, while focusing
upon the existence of unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in the
region, also contained calls for a Middle East zone free of all
WMD and their delivery systems. The latter has been the
subject of annual UNGA resolutions.
Given this context, it has been clear for some time that
the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle
East is unlikely to be achieved without very significant
extra-regional pressure and assistance. The US role in relation
to Israel is key in this regard.
Recommendations
• States should increase efforts to ensure the adherence and
compliance of regional countries to international
non-proliferation measures.
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• States should redouble their efforts to achieve the goals and
objectives of the Resolution on the Middle East.
• Israel and the Palestinian Authority should intensify their
efforts to find a political settlement.
20.  Israel & Universality
‘The Conference recalls that in paragraph 4 of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East the Conference ‘calls
upon all States in the Middle East that have not yet done so, without exception, to accede to the Treaty as
soon as possible….’ The Conference notes, in this connection, that the report of the United Nations
Secretariat on the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East (NPT/CONF.2000/7) states that
several States have acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference
welcomes the accession of these States and reaffirms the importance of Israel’s accession to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty …. in realising the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty in the Middle East.’
[The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, paragraph 3]
Negotiating history
This paragraph was the result of intense negotiations
conducted in SB.2. It assesses progress towards fulfilling the
goal of universality of the NPT in the Middle East – as
contained in the 1995 Resolution – in the light of the
accessions to the Treaty since 1995. One important difference
between the language in 1995 and that in 2000, was that
whereas in 1995 all states in the Middle East were called upon
to accede to the Treaty, in 2000, Israel alone was mentioned
as, by then, it was the only state that had not acceded.
However, by ‘reaffirming’ the importance of Israel’s
accession, the Conference avoided appearing to propose a
new departure. In this way, it enabled a compromise to be
reached between the demands of the Arab states that the
Review Conference should call upon Israel to accede to the
Treaty and the US reluctance to accept this development.
See also the ‘The Resolution on the Middle East’ in the
Negotiating history of the section above.
Interpretations
This is the first occasion in which Israel’s non-adherence to
the Treaty has been singled out in accepted NPT Review
Conference language. The first part of the paragraph quotes
the language adopted in the 1995 Resolution on the Middle
East, which calls upon ‘all States…without exception’ to
accede to the NPT, but does not refer to Israel by name. The
second part of the paragraph goes further by welcoming the
1997 accession of the remaining Arab states in the region and,
in the same sentence, reaffirming the importance that Israel
take the same action. This reinforces the point that Israel is
now the only state in the Middle East that is not party to the
NPT.35 There is no ambiguity here, or in the call for Israel to
accede to the Treaty to realise ‘the goal of universal adherence
to the Treaty in the Middle East.’
Political realities
See ‘Political realities’ sub-section of 19, above.
Recommendations
• Efforts should be made to promote regional peace and
security and regional arms control and disarmament
arrangements.
• Israel should accept IAEA safeguards on all its
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
• States parties, particularly the US, should engage in a
dialogue with Israel concerning specific steps it could take
towards acceptance of full-scope safeguards and eventual
accession to the NPT.
21.  The Nuclear-Weapon Status of India and Pakistan
‘With respect to the nuclear explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in May 1998, …India and
Pakistan do not have the status of nuclear-weapon States.’ [South Asia and other regional issues, para. 12]
‘The Conference deplores the nuclear test explosions carried out by India and then by Pakistan in 1998. The
Conference declares that such actions do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon State status or any
special status whatsoever.’ [Articles I and II and first to third preambular paragraphs, paragraph 9]
Negotiating history
During discussions over the non-adherence of India and
Pakistan to the NPT, there was some disagreement over
whether and how to express international concern over the
nuclear tests that both states conducted in May 1998, and their
consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This
was resolved through an agreement to reiterate the points
made in the NWS statement, which emphasised that the
nuclear tests did not confer nuclear-weapon state status as
defined by the Treaty and called upon India and Pakistan to
implement UN Security Council resolution 1172. This
resolution set out the benchmarks under which the US and
others could agree to lift sanctions incrementally in response
to progress in its implementation by India and Pakistan.
Interpretations
This is an unambiguous statement, making it clear to the
governments of India and Pakistan, as well as to all parties to
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the NPT, that the tests of 1998 do not confer on them
nuclear-weapon state status. This point was also made very
clearly in the discussions relating to the second and third
preambular paragraphs, which went further in emphasising
that the tests ‘do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon State
status or any special status whatsoever’. In stressing this
point, the Conference was urging NPT parties to abide by
their Treaty obligations and not to reward India and Pakistan
with any special status. One practical aspect of this, however,
is the question of whether it remains legitimate to offer them
civil nuclear technical assistance or exports. Some argue that
all technical assistance should be denied to their civil nuclear
programmes, while others regard this as limited to those
nuclear activities which are in contravention of the NSG
Guidelines as interpreted by its members (i.e. their nuclear
weapon activities).36
Political realities
Following the 1998 nuclear tests, political and military
leaders in India and Pakistan stated that the explosions
provided them with a new status on the world stage. Both
countries sought international recognition of this status. They
urged governments to accept that, even if they could not be
officially recognised as NWS under the terms of the NPT,
they should be given de facto recognition.
A number of states, including the US, imposed sanctions
on India and Pakistan following the tests. These punitive
measures were accompanied by offers of conditional
inducements: the US agreed to lift sanctions incrementally in
response to progress by India and Pakistan in implementing
UN Security Council resolution 1172. Benchmarks for
progress included: restraints on their nuclear weapons and
material programmes, especially non-deployment of nuclear
weapons and an end to missile testing; accession to the CTBT;
participation in international negotiations for an FMCT; and
stronger export controls on nuclear materials and technology.
More recently, following the terrorist attacks of 11
September 2001, President Bush announced the lifting of all
remaining sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan in the
wake of the 1998 nuclear tests. Japan followed suit. This
action could be interpreted by India and Pakistan as
acquiescing to their self-declared nuclear status, and
indirectly conferring on India and Pakistan the special nuclear
status that the 2000 NPT Review Conference was so anxious
to deny. The full consequences of this action have yet to
emerge, but it could be argued to make it even less probable
than hitherto that India and Pakistan will accede to the NPT
as NNWS, and may offer encouragement for other would-be
proliferators to withdraw from the Treaty.
Recommendations
• States parties should continue to deny India and Pakistan
nuclear-weapon state status and should continue to follow,
in regard to these two states, existing export restrictions as
applicable to NNWS.
• States should explore and implement additional bilateral
and/or regional non-proliferation and confidence-building
measures.
• India and Pakistan should be encouraged to join existing
treaties, such as the CTBT, and to participate actively and
positively in other nuclear-related negotiations, such as the
proposed FMCT.
22.  India/Pakistan and Universality
‘The Conference urges India and Pakistan to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon
States …’ [South Asia and other regional issues, paragraph 13].
Negotiating history
There was little controversy over the proposal urging India
and Pakistan to accede to the NPT, or further proposals
calling on both states to implement the steps set out in UN
Security Council resolution 1172, which also included this
action.
Interpretations
This paragraph can only be interpreted as an unambiguous
call to India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear-weapon
programmes and accede to the NPT as NNWS.
Political realities
International concerns persist over the potential regional and
global consequences of the self-declared nuclear-weapon
status of India and Pakistan, and the induction of nuclear
weapons into their armed forces. Especially after tension
increased, following the terrorist attack on the Indian
parliament in December 2001, fears of a catastrophic nuclear
exchange between the two states, with grave consequences
for South Asian security and global peace, have grown apace.
Since 1998 there has been a slow process of engagement
with India and Pakistan by key members of the international
community. This has become more visible and
comprehensive since the events of 11 September 2001. This
raises the question of how the non-proliferation regime
should now deal with the universality issue, given that there
now seems to exist some tacit acceptance, if not actual
legitimisation, of the continued existence of the
nuclear-weapons programmes of India and Pakistan.
Recommendations
• At the PrepCom for the 2005 Review Conference, parties
should formulate, for eventual adoption at the Conference,
a joint approach to deal with the universality issue in
relation to India and Pakistan, which reflects the
recognition that these states cannot, by definition, be
considered or treated as NWS.
• States parties should make no attempt to amend the NPT
to enable India and Pakistan to accede as NWS.
• India and Pakistan should be encouraged to take steps that
allow them to accede to the NPT as NNWS.
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23. Cuba and the NPT
‘The Conference urges all States not yet party to the Treaty, namely Cuba, India, Israel, and Pakistan, to
accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without condition, particularly those
States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.’ [Article I, paragraph 8]
Negotiating history
Discussions on the universality issue focused primarily on the
non-adherence of India, Israel and Pakistan, rather than on
Cuba. (See ‘Negotiating history’, sections 19 and 21, above.)
Interpretations
This is a call to all the states that remain outside the NPT,
including Cuba, to accede to the Treaty, as NNWS.  It thus
calls on Cuba to accede to the Treaty ‘promptly and without
condition,’ but in the same sentence stresses the particular
need for states ‘that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities’
to accede. The former encourages Cuba to drop the conditions
that it currently places on its accession to the Treaty (i.e. total,
verifiable disarmament by all states, including the NWS). The
latter highlights the fact that Cuba is not regarded as a
potential nuclear-weapon state, as its nuclear facilities are
already under IAEA safeguards.
Political realities
Cuba does not have a nuclear-weapon programme and has
signed, though not ratified, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
However, it does not consider universality of the NPT to be
possible, arguing that it is discriminatory ‘giving immense
privileges to a small number of countries.’37
Recommendations
• Cuba should accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon
state.
24.  Universality and Regional Security
‘The Conference undertakes to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality
of the Treaty. These efforts should include the enhancement of regional security, particularly in areas of
tension such as in the Middle East and South Asia.’ [Article IX, paragraph 4]
Negotiating history
Many states felt that, although regional tensions in the Middle
East and South Asia undermined the chances for achieving
universality of the NPT, they were too complex and
far-reaching for the NPT Review process to deal with
effectively. They also considered general questions regarding
the political and security concerns of both regions, and the
controversies relating to them, as going beyond the specific
remit of the NPT. The language adopted recognised the links
between regional security concerns and the willingness of
specific states to accede to the NPT, but the actions to be taken
remained couched in vague and general language.
Interpretations
Interpretations may differ as to what should constitute the
‘determined efforts’ towards the goal of universality that the
states party to the Treaty are called upon to make in this
paragraph. Its second part goes some way to explain what is
expected, namely taking actions to enhance the general
security of the two regions which contain non-parties.
However, individual parties are left to decide what kinds of
measures would constitute fulfilment of this commitment.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – the PrepCom to the 2005 NPT
Review Conference debates the universality issue,
agreeing on concrete steps to enhance regional security in
the Middle East and South Asia, and to encourage Cuba to
accede to the Treaty.
• Positive steps – agreement is reached on some, if not all,
of the above.
• No movement – the PrepCom debates the issue, but no
concrete measures are agreed.
• Outright non-fulfilment – the PrepCom does not discuss
the issue of universality or regional security in the two
regions, and no concrete steps are taken to seek
universality.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
Along with the issue of non-compliance, universality has
become one of the most challenging issues confronting the
NPT, and the review process. The problems involved in
bringing the remaining states – particularly India, Israel and
Pakistan – into the Treaty are so complex that it is difficult to
see how the goal of universality can be achieved in the near
future. To date, despite the recommendations of NPT Review
Conferences, there has been little progress in this area.  In
addition, regional tensions have been escalating (see
‘Political realities’ of 19 and 21–23, above), and recent
actions by some NPT parties may be argued to have
undermined prospects for achieving universality.
Recommendations
• The PrepCom to the 2005 NPT Review Conference should
debate the universality issue and agree to concrete steps to
enhance regional security in the Middle East and South
Asia, and to encourage Cuba to accede to the Treaty.
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25.  Steps to be Taken by the President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference in Relation to Universality
‘The Conference requests the President of the Conference to convey formally the views of States parties on
this issue to all non-parties and to report their responses to the parties. Such efforts should contribute to
enhancing the universality of the Treaty and the Adherence of non-parties to it.’ [Article IX, paragraph 10]
Negotiating history
This is a redrafted and more limited version of a paragraph
found in a Conference paper submitted to MC.I by eight
Western European states on 9 May38 (NPT/CONF.2000/
MC.I/CRP.15).
Interpretations
The paragraph mandates Ambassador Baali to convey the
views of states parties on universality to non-parties, and
report on any responses, presumably at sessions of the
PrepCom and/or the Conference.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – Ambassador Baali contacts the four
non-parties, and reports their reactions to the 2002
Prepcom session.
• Positive steps – Ambassador Baali contacts the four
non-parties but receives no reaction from them.
• No movement – N/A.
• Outright non-fulfilment – Ambassador Baali takes no
action and/or no reports are provided to the PrepCom.
• Other actions – N/A.
Political realities
Given the situation concerning all four states, it is unlikely
that any positive and constructive responses will be
forthcoming from them.
Recommendations
• The chairperson of the first session of the PrepCom should
ask Ambassador Baali if he has contacted the states in
question and, if so, what answers he has received.
• The chairperson of the PrepCom sessions should report the
outcomes of any discussion on universality to the
non-parties.
26.  Reporting on State Actions to Promote Universality of the NPT in the Middle East
‘The Conference requests all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle
East and other interested States, to report through the United Nations Secretariat to the President of the
2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well
as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on
the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of…. the realization of the goals and objectives of
the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. It requests that the Secretariat prepare a compilation of those
reports in preparation for consideration of these matters at the Preparatory Committee meetings and the
2005 Review Conference.’ [The Middle East, particularly implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the
Middle East, paragraph 7]
Negotiating history
Egypt wanted strong language to emerge from the 2000 NPT
Review Conference to ensure that the 1995 Resolution on the
Middle East was implemented. In one of several papers and
statements on the subject, it proposed follow-up work for the
period 2000–05, either by appointing a special
representative/envoy or convening a conference to address
the issue; or having the three depository states pursue
discussions with Israel regarding accession to the NPT. These
proposals were opposed by the US, France and others, who
did not want the Conference to establish precedents for
inter-sessional work, and were concerned about embroiling it
in problems that were beyond its scope. However, despite
these reservations, language was eventually agreed calling
for individual states to address the universality issue and to
offer their views on how they were doing this to the President
of the 2005 NPT Review Conference and to the Chairpersons
of its PrepCom sessions.
Interpretations
This is a call to all NPT parties, especially the NWS and states
in the Middle East, to report on the steps they have taken to
promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution, and thus
universality of the Treaty. Unlike the language on reporting
included in the ‘13 steps’ (see 12, above), this paragraph
provides a general outline of the reporting procedure and
guidance on the content of the reports, although not their
format.
The reference to ‘other interested States’ was included
in response to a Canadian request, in order to allow for a more
distinct role for states such as Australia, Canada and Japan in
pursuing the goal of universality. (These states have taken an
active interest in the region, but are neither NWSs nor states
of the region. Canada, in its capacity as Chairman of SB.2,
was facilitating the negotiations between Egypt and the US).
The language was not specifically aimed at including Israel
in the reporting process.
Levels of fulfilment
• Complete fulfilment – all NWS and states in the Middle
East draft reports on the steps they have taken to promote
the implementation of the resolution, including
universality, and present these to the UN Secretariat for
transmission to the Chairpersons of the PrepCom and the
President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
• Positive steps – some states parties take the steps described
above.
• No movement – N/A.
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• Outright non-fulfilment – no NPT parties provide the
requested reports and no compilation is provided by the
UN Secretariat to the PrepCom and the Conference.
• Other actions – Israel reports to the UN Secretariat on the
steps it has taken to promote a MENWFZ.
Political realities
It remains unclear how this process might further universality
of the NPT in the Middle East, other than highlighting the
issue.
Recommendations
• The NWS and states parties in the Middle East should draft
reports on the steps they have taken to promote universality
of the NPT in the region, and present these to the UN
Secretariat.
• The UN Secretariat should provide a framework for the
reports and collate and present them to the Chairpersons
of the PrepCom and President of the 2005 Review
Conference.
• Israel should also be asked to provide the UN Secretariat
with a report on the steps that it has taken in this area.
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personal expertise by the Director General of the IAEA, in
consultation with governments, to advise him on effectiveness and
cost-efficiency in the implementation of IAEA safeguards. SAGSI
has provided much of the inspiration for the current program to
strengthen IAEA safeguards and continues to review developments.
A key topic for SAGSI is the development of integrated safeguards,
that is, the optimal combination of comprehensive safeguards and
strengthened safeguards measures under the Additional Protocol.
SAGSI has reviewed the IAEA Secretariat’s work plan for integrated
safeguards and advised the Secretariat on various aspects of it.
SAGSI examines major safeguards matters, such as integrated
safeguards, the ongoing development of safeguards concepts and
approaches, safeguards parameters, evaluation methodologies, and
quality systems. During 2001 there was a thorough review of the role
of ‘timeliness’ (e.g. frequency of inspections) in integrated
safeguards. Other subjects addressed by SAGSI have included the
role of containment and surveillance measures, and the
categorisation of nuclear material for safeguards purposes.
6. 51 NPT parties have yet to conclude an INFCIRC/153
safeguards agreement with the IAEA. These include, in Europe:
Andorra, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, The Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Turkmenistan. In Africa:
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Republic of
Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and
Principe, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Togo, Uganda, Seychelles,
Tanzania. In Asia and the Asia/Pacific: Laos, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia, Palau, and Vanuatu. In Latin America and the
Caribbean: Haiti. In the Middle East: Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait,
Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and
Yemen.
7. In addition to the NWS, Belgium, Germany, Japan, and
Switzerland were involved in drawing up the guidelines.
8. The guidelines include a provision for review in ‘not less than
five years’ after their publication by the IAEA, or not sooner than
2003.
9. The difference between the Zangger Committee and the NSG
is spelt out in two of the deleted paragraphs: numbers 41 and 70
respectively. The Zangger Committee does not set rules for exports,
but has the job of interpreting article II (2) so as to determine what
items should ‘trigger’ safeguards.
10. These are a group of states whose representatives to the IAEA
in Vienna have traditionally provided language on these issues. They
are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden.
11. Paragraph 12 states that: ‘New supply arrangements for the
transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or
production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon
states should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of
IAEA full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding
commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices.
12. China had expressed reservations about this paragraph in
1995, arguing that since the NPT refers to safeguards and not
full-scope safeguards, the Treaty text overrides the language of the
1995 Principles and Objectives.
13. The text of the deleted paragraphs on export controls and
full-scope safeguards was as follows:
Paragraph 24: ‘The Conference recalls the commitment of the
nuclear-weapon States in article I of the Treaty not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices, directly
or indirectly. The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to
commit themselves not to enter into any kind of nuclear technical
cooperation with States not party to the NPT.’
Paragraph 40: ‘The Conference encourages the States parties,
within their national rules and regulations, to ensure that the transfer
of certain items to States parties to the Treaty will only be used for
peaceful purposes according to Articles I, II, III, and IV of the
Treaty.’
Paragraph 41: ‘The Conference notes that a number of States
parties engaged in the supply of nuclear material and equipment have
met regularly as an informal group known as the Zangger
Committee, in order to co-ordinate their implementation of Article
III, paragraph 2 of the Treaty. To this end, these States have adopted
certain understandings, including a list of items triggering IAEA
safeguards, for their export to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties
to the Treaty, as set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/209 as
amended.’
Paragraph 42: ‘The Conference notes the two International
Seminars on the role of Export Controls in Nuclear
Non-Proliferation, held in 1997 in Vienna and 1999 in New York,
organised by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, as designed to contribute
to transparency as called for in paragraph 17 of decision 2 (Principles
and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament)
adopted by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference.’
Paragraph 61: ‘The Conference encourages States parties to
consider establishing an INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreement
coupled with an additional protocol as constituting the IAEA
full-scope safeguards referred to in paragraph 12 of Decision 2 of
the 1995 NPT Review Conference.’
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Paragraph 68: ‘The Conference invites all States to adopt the
understandings of the Zangger Committee in connection with any
nuclear co-operation with non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to
the Treaty.’
Paragraph 70: ‘The Conference notes that a number of States
parties also co-operate on a voluntary basis through guidelines for
their nuclear-related exports, as set forth in IAEA document
INFCIRC/254 as amended.’
Paragraph 72: ‘The Conference invites coordination of national
policies among all interested States parties to the extent possible,
including through the IAEA, in a manner that would contribute to
the non-proliferation objectives of the NPT and facilitate
transparency and participation of all interested States parties in the
fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy,
in conformity with Articles I, II, III, and IV of the Treaty.’
14. Article I, paragraph 3 states that ‘…the nuclear-weapon
States reaffirm their commitment not to transfer to any recipient
whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any
non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.’ Article I, paragraph 4 repeats
this undertaking in relation to the NNWS.
15. Article IV, paragraph 3 states that ‘The Conference reaffirms
the undertaking by all parties to the Treaty to facilitate, and have the
right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material, and scientific and technological information for the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy among States parties to the Treaty.
The Conference notes the contribution that such uses can make to
progress in general and to helping to overcome the technological and
economic disparities between developed and developing countries.’
16. The text of the paragraph deleted from
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/CRP.13/Rev.1 was as follows:
Paragraph 9: ‘The Conference notes with satisfaction that, since the
last Review Conference, with the two regrettable exceptions caused
by non-compliance with their safeguards agreements by two States
parties, the IAEA has continued to provide States parties with
assurance that nuclear material that had been declared and placed
under safeguards had not been diverted for any military purpose or
for purposes unknown, or that facilities, equipment, non-nuclear
material and other items placed under safeguards had not been
misused.’ (This was a G-10 proposal from
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.II/WP.2).
17. The Annual Report of the IAEA for the year 2000 states that:
‘The Agency has been able to monitor the freeze on the DPRK’s
graphite moderated reactors and related facilities, as requested by
the UN Security Council and as foreseen in the Agreed Framework
of October 1994 between the US and the DPRK.’ (Annual Report of
the IAEA, 2000, p.97)
18. This was a parallel regional inspection regime, set up to carry
out bilateral inspections between the ROK and the DPRK.
19. The doctrine holds that, if a state is attacked by another state
in violation of international law, the state attacked is freed from all
international commitments with regard to the attacking state, and
therefore has the right to respond with whatever weapons it may
choose, including nuclear weapons. However, the response must be
proportionate and necessary to stop any further attack, raising
questions as to whether a nuclear attack would ever be justified by
this doctrine.
20. A number of Arab states in North Africa have already signed
up to the Pelindaba Treaty.
21. Discussions on this 20-article draft convention were initiated
in 1996 by the Russian Federation. It covers the use or threat to use
nuclear related items to kill or injure persons, damage property or
the environment, or to compel persons, states or international
organisations to do or refrain from doing any act. This includes the
unauthorised receipt of nuclear materials belonging to a state party
through fraud, theft, or forcible seizure. Important elements of the
Draft Convention were drawn from the 1980 Convention on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material covering sea transportation
of nuclear materials. The draft is under consideration by the Legal
Committee of the UNGA, which in December 1996 created an Ad
Hoc Committee to discuss it. On 17–27 February 1998 a detailed
review of alternative modalities to address the problem took place,
including a new convention or a protocol to either the 1980
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material or the
1997 Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. This
review concluded that a new convention was required and that it
should complement existing international treaties, but the Legal
Committee is still unable to reach a consensus view on how to move
forward with this matter.  The draft paragraph on the Convention
stated: “The Conferences (sic) stresses the need for rapid conclusion
of the Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism”,
NPT/Conf.2000/MC.II/CRP.13/Rev.1, 11 May 2000, para.49.
22. Among non-parties to this are the DPRK, Iran, and Iraq.
Israel has signed but not ratified, and Pakistan acceded in October
2000.
23. When the Convention on Physical Protection was being
negotiated in 1979, the US wanted the  standards in the Convention
to apply to all national facilities as well as transport, but under
pressure from others agreed that establishing physical protection
standards for international transport should have first priority.
24. Before this meeting, Director General Mohammed El
Baradei stated that, although the risk of terrorism had been
recognised in the past, increased precautions were now essential
because terrorist use of nuclear materials ‘seems far more likely in
the wake of September 11.’ Washington Post, 2 November 2001.
25. The obligations of the contracting parties are largely based
on the IAEA safety fundamentals document ‘The Principles of
Radioactive Waste Management,’ and include, in particular,
obligations to:
• establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to
govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste;
• ensure that individuals, society and the environment are
adequately protected against radiological and other hazards by
appropriate siting, design and construction of facilities, and by
making provisions for ensuring the safety of facilities during
operation and after their closure;
• abide by the IAEA Code of Practice on the International
Trans-boundary Movement of Radioactive Waste; and
• take appropriate steps to ensure that disused sealed sources are
managed safely.
The Joint Convention includes transparency measures, which
provide for states to provide national reports on how they are
implementing each obligation of the Convention. Specific
information must be provided to the Agency by states parties,
including details on each state’s spent fuel and radioactive waste
management policies and practices.
26. The US Union of Concerned Scientists has been stressing
this point. Reuters (San Francisco) 4 November 2001.
27. US cooling pools are designed to withstand earthquakes,
tornadoes, and other natural calamities, but were not built
specifically to withstand acts of sabotage such as the impact of a
jetliner. These pools, initially intended as temporary facilities, now
hold considerably more spent fuel than a nuclear reactor. It has been
argued that if a pool was hit, and the water boiled or drained away,
the discarded fuel would overheat, melt or catch fire, threatening to
release a radioactive cloud.
28. Article 29 of the Convention requires that the Preparatory
Meeting of Contracting Parties should fix a date for the first review
meeting, which, under the terms of the Convention, should not be
later than 30 months after the date of entry into force.
29. The states in question that have not signed the Treaty include:
the DPRK, Iraq and Iran. Algeria, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, Iceland,
Indonesia, India, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Monaco, Morocco,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, and
Uruguay, have signed but not ratified or deposited instruments of
ratification. Of these, India, Israel and Kazakhstan are of particular
concern, as each has at least one nuclear installation that has achieved
criticality in a reactor core. Pakistan ratified the Convention on 29
December 1997.
30. The Convention establishes a legal obligation on the part of
the parties to apply certain general safety principles to the
construction, operation and regulation of civilian nuclear power
plants under their jurisdiction. The aim is to reach and maintain high
standards of nuclear power station safety worldwide, to create and
uphold precautions against dangers from nuclear power plants, and
to prevent/contain accidents from radioactive fallout. One of the
Convention’s primary safety principles is that each party should
establish a nuclear regulatory organisation that is effectively
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separated from the regulated industry and from government
organisations that promote nuclear power. Each party’s nuclear
safety programme is to include such elements as radiation protection,
quality assurance, emergency preparedness, and nuclear facility
siting, design and construction, and operation. Parties to the
Convention agree to submit periodic reports on the steps they are
taking to implement the obligations of the Convention. At the 1999
Review, only three parties to the Convention, namely Bangladesh,
Mali and the Republic of Moldova, failed to comply with the basic
obligations of the Convention to submit a National Report and attend
the meeting. Singapore submitted a National Report but did not
attend the meeting.
31. The al Qaeda terrorist network is known to have attempted
to acquire weapons-grade HEU. It is not known whether these efforts
have been successful, but it does seem to have managed to get hold
of some LEU. Officials also suspect that the group may have
obtained spent fuel and other radioactive material, which could be
used in a so-called ‘dirty bomb’ or radiological weapon.
32. The 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, co-sponsored by
the depository states, was the political condition placed by a number
of Arab states and several members of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM), on their consent to the indefinite extension of the NPT in
1995. It calls, inter alia, for all States in the region to accede to the
NPT.
33. See NPT/CONF.2000/PC.I/32, pp. 53-55; NPT/
CONF.2000/PC.II/32 p.15; and NPT/CONF.2000/PC.III/12.
34. See page 28 for a more detailed discussion of this debate.
35. Following the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East, three of
the four remaining non-NPTstates in the region (Djibouti, Oman,
and the United Arab Emirates) acceded to the NPT, leaving Israel
isolated.
36. Article III, paragraph 3, implies that, in principle, nuclear
exports to non-parties for peaceful purposes are legitimate and
therefore any blanket ban on such exports would contradict the
Treaty.
37. Cuba’s position was set-out very clearly at the Moscow
International Non-Proliferation Conference on 7 October 2000, by
Dr, Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart of Cuba’s Higher Institute of Science
and Technology. He stated that ‘Cuba agreed to sign the Treaty of
Tlateloco and the additional protocol as a gesture of goodwill and
transparency,’ but ‘Only when the idea of “prohibition” – which is
broader in scope than “non-proliferation” – is understood and
accepted by all, can a universal regime for the prohibition of nuclear
weapons and the creation of common goals and objectives be
fulfilled.’ ‘Cuba’s Nuclear Straddle,’ Proliferation Brief, Vol. 3,
Number 31, 25 October 2000. Available at: http://www.ceip.org/
files/nonprolif/templates/articles.asp?NewsID=538.
38. ‘Proposed language submitted by Belgium, Denmark,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, The
Netherlands for Paragraph II 4 of the MC.I chairman’s working
paper on Universality’, NPT/CONF.200/MC.I/CRP.15, 9 May
2000.  This asked ‘…The President and the chairmen of the next
Preparatory Committees’ sessions to informally consult with all
States not yet party of the Treaty and to report to the respective
Preparatory Committees’ sessions and the next Review Conference.
During these informal consultations, the President and the chairmen
should submit to these states all agreed documents of the previous
Conference or session’. 
Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
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CD Conference on Disarmament
CRP Conference Room Paper
CSBM Confidence and Security-Building Measure
CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
FMCT Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
HEU Highly Enriched Uranium
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
ICJ International Court of Justice
IDC International Data Centre
IMS International Monitoring System
INFCIRC Information Circular
LEU Low Enriched Uranium
LWR Light Water Reactor
MC Main Committee
MENWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East
NAC New Agenda Coalition
NAM Non-Aligned Movement
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NNWS Non-Nuclear Weapon States
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSA Negative Security Assurance
NSG Nuclear Suppliers Group
NWFW Nuclear Weapon Free World
NWFZ Nuclear Weapon Free Zone
NWS Nuclear Weapon States
P&Os 1995 Principles and Objectives for Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
PAROS Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space
PMG Plutonium Management Guidelines
PrepCom Preparatory Committee
Pu Plutonium
SAGSI Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards
Implementation
SB Subsidiary Body
UNDC UN Disarmament Committee
UNGA UN General Assembly
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WP Working Paper
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